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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM ',FOR STUDY
I.

INTRODUCTION

After centuries of struggle the world has reached a point
where representative governments are firmly established as
functioning governmental bodies.

There has emerged in this, era

of the 20th century a host of nations whose highest levels of
policy are formulated by democratic means, indicating that the
people influenced by these governments are to large degree the
influential and in the last resort sovereign.

The people then,

not the "prince” maintain the attributes of sovereignty.

Accord-

to J. S. Mill,
The meaning of representative government is that the
whole people, or some numerous portion of them, exercise,
through deputies periodically elected by themselves, the
ultimate controlling power, which in every constitution
must reside somewhere.
This ultimate power they must
possess in all its completeness; they must be masters,
whenever they please, of all^ the operations of the govern
ment .1
In order for the people to be ''masters” of governmental
operations there must have evolved along with the people’s
control a method or procedure for governing the popular assem
blies,

"The evolution of the modern democratic process

■^John Stewart Mill, Considerations on Representative
Government, (London: George~Tlout ledge and Sons), P V 821
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is fused to the development of parliamentary procedure,
.

(

as a systematic method for giving each man or his representa
tive a voice in establishing the law."^
Thus governing bodies, deliberative assemblies, world
law-making organizations, must themselves first be governed
by laws.

Democratic bodies from the United Nations to the

League of Women Voters as a first act of organization usually
construct a set of laws that they must abide by in everyday
functioning in order that they insure their internal order.
The.laws that are self imposed upon any organization rep
resent the basis upon which the laws of direct consequence
to the people are inacted.

But organizational laws go

deeper yet; without them there could be no adequate way of
insuring any form of deliberative order.

As a realization

of this we can trace back in time a succession of organizat
ional procedure that has often been the key to the degree of
effectiveness to which bodies have functioned.

Indeed,

parliamentary procedure and democracy invariably accompany
each other.

From the earliest origins of the British

Parliament, the growth of representative government has been
marked by an ever increasing system of formal procedure that
has imposed order on the actions of parliament in direct
ratio to the freedom to handle its own affairs were won

O

Dwight Allen, "Parliamentary Procedure", Social
Education, Vol. XXI (November, 1957)> P» 303•
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from the King.
The general philosophy of democratic government and
that of parliamentary procedure are the same.

Sturgis has

said, "the philosophy of each is based on freedom of the
group and of the individual, on equality of opportunities
and responsibilities for all, and on the right of the
majority to decide."3

Gray goes further when he writes,

...the parliamentary form of government is based
essentially on freedom of discussion, freedom of
speech, freedom to evaluate, to critize, to
protect, to act or to recind action.
Further it is
based on the recognition of the fact that no one
member or group of members has the rights orrprivileges
that may be denied any other member or group of members,
and that minorities have privileges as great as the
majorities
Sturgis states that,
Parliamentary law is concerned with the means by
which beliefs and ideas are best translated into
effective group action.
It must provide orderly
ways of the will of the majority.
It must be clear,
considerate, kind, fair* and it must effect the
desired aims of the assembly.
It must, in other
words, be democratic.5
The rules of parliamentary procedure then, have evolved
through history as a method of implementing and maintaining
the Ideals of democratic society.

The rules themselves are

simply mechanical and could be considered useless without

^Alice F. Sturgis, Learning Parliamentary Procedure.
(New Yorks McGraw-Hill Co., 1953),~pT 21.
^Wilkenson Gray, "Philosophy of Parliamentary Law",
Quarterly Journal of Speech. (October, 19^1), p. ^3?»
^Allce P. Sturgis, Sturgis Standard Code of Parliamentary
Procedure. (Nevr York: McGraw-Hill"Co., 1950), p. 8.
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the required accompaniment of a democratic philosophy— a
, philosophy that must be active in practice and spirit as
well as name or the rules of procedure may become not tools
to implement but rather tools to pervert the aims and ideals
of democracy.
Perhaps there is no better example of the fate of a
body that espoused democratic ideals and yet was unable to
function because of a lack of procedure than the French
National assembly at the time of the French Revolution.
A hundred members might be seen trying to address
the House at the same time. The authority of the
president was wholly disregarded.
Spectators applauded
or hissed at pleasure.
No rules were observed in the
conduct of business.
Sir Samuel Romilly, deeply
sympathetic, had prepared a statement of the practice
of the House of Commons, and Mirabeau had translated
it into French.
It was ignored. Much of the violence
which prevailed in the Assembly would have been allayed,
and many rash measures unquestionably prevented, if
their proceedings had been conducted with order and
regularity.°
Thomas Jefferson, realizing the need for a body of
rules for the new nation of America and probably aware of
the debacle in the French Assembly, utilized the usages of
the British Parliament to form the basis of procedure for
the newly formed American Congress.

It was as he said,

ua sketch, which those who after me will successively
correct and fill up, till a code of rules shall be formed for

^Robert Luce, Legislative Procedure,
Mifflin Co., 1922), p. 1.

(Boston: Houghton

the use of the Senate, the effects of which may be an
accuracy of business, economy of time, order, uniformity,
and i m p a r t i a l i t y , , J e f f e r s o n was right.

His manual, has

grown into volumes that serve as the basis of deliberation
for the democratic assemblies of the world.
But on what plane do we view procedure?

Luce has

asked if, "parliamentary law be spoken of in the same
breath with the Magna Carta, The Bill of Rights, the
Declaration of

Independence?'^

perhaps we can turn to

Justice Frankfurter for the answer when he concluded,
"the history of liberty has largely been a history of
observance of procedural

s a f e g u a r d s ."9

Indeed, parliamentary

procedure is the safeguard of the very essence of democracy
where the will of the people is to be ascertained— a n d ’
abided by.

i
II.

THE PROBLEM,
‘\

The twofold purpose of this Study was to discover
(1) a history of the quorum, and (2) a philosophy of the
quorum, as shown by an examination of significant events
that have occurred In American political history.

7
rThomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice.
(New York: Clark & Maynard, Pub. 1&73)» p. 6.
®Luce, op. clt.. p. 2.
9"The Revolution in Criminal Justice", Time. July 16,
1965, p. 22.

The limitation to American political history is intended
to keep the bounds of this study within a recognizable
political framework.

However, this study does deal with

those events of significance concerning the quorum that
occurred in English history because it was in that nation
?

that the general rules of parliamentary law were started and
developed into an organized system.

America, as a nation

whose cultural roots are primarily derived from England,
has, accordingly, taken its basic system of rules of procedure
directly from the English through colonial charters, Jefferson’
Manual of Legislative Procedure, the first body of rules for
the U. S. Congress, etc.. Thus, it is reasonable that any
study of American procedure should begin with a consider
ation of the "Mother of Parliaments" for inceptions of those
parliamentary devices which have been accepted by the United
States decision-making groups.
Importance of study: America has been accused of being
over-organizedl.

That is, persons living in communities

across the land represent a nation of joiners.

As a nation,

we organize in flower clubs, Parent-Teacher Associations,
state and national houses of government.

Since there are

in the United States at least 2,000,OOO-^ organizations
of various types, it becomes apparent that we tend to act
in groups for the attainment of. our goals.

One writer, Paul
.&'

lOSturgis, op. bit., p. 4*
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Hoffman, has stated that America1s voluntary organizations
are the:VMgreatest phenomenon of American democracy.
It is in light of this phenomenon

that the importance

of this study is to be found.
The American system of (private and governmental)
group decision-making is based on the assumption that the
individual is capable of self-government.

To realize

this assumption, minimum standards of representation must
occur as part of the democratic process if the wish of
individual is to

the

be truly effective in this decision

making process.
Since the quorum is an essential device of assuring
adequate participation of the individual and thus assuring
government of majority rule and minority protection, a
knowledge of the history and philosophy of this central
concept will contribute to our understanding of the demo
cratic decision-making process.

It is this very understand

ing of the democratic process that may well aid in the pre
servation of the individual’s right to participate in decisions
that ultimately effect him.
III.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1332, the English House of Commons established a
new set of procedural rules in an attempt to handle more

^ Ibid., p. 21.

efficiently the ever-growing amount of business they were
required to transact.

The enactment of the new rules s

signified more than a desire to streamline the working of
the House; rather, the act reflected the need for effeciency
to cope with the problems of increased trade, colonial
management and perhaps, even more important, the enlargement
and growing complexity of the functions of government.
The ideas of democracy were by this time well imbedded in
England, as a new, growing and enfranchised middle class
endeavored to enlarge their interests.

It was one more

act that reflected the changing structure of power in
England as the King’s prerogatives became less and less
dominant.

The loss of dominance had taken much time:

from the medieval parliament of the Estates in the thirteenth
century to the nineteenth century.^
The Kings of the early medieval parliaments would on
occasion, call together those persons whom they felt could
offer them needful advice.

In time, these persons became

grouped as to their status, with the well-to-do on one side
and the lesser merchants and landowners on the other.
Subsequently, a clerk was appointed to record the
activities of the parliaments— as they were now called.

1o

For a better understanding of the growth and devel
opment of parliament see any of the numerous general history
series, i.e.’, Charles Knight, History of England (New York:
John Wurtele Lovell, l$Sl)
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At first, the records were very scanty but expanded to include records of proceedings and at times the speeches of
the members.

These records were entered into volumes that

outlined the nature and forms which the parliaments fol
lowed.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries formal

treatises on the nature of procedures during various eras
were compiled by

Elsynge,-^

Hakewel,^ and others,.of the

period.
■These treatises represent not only a record of ac
tivities but are manifestations of the continually grow
ing body of customary law.

The growth of the parliament

ary system showed signs of sophistication during this periods
by the practice of electing members to the House, util
ization of a committee system and an air of formality that
became, part of the proceedings.

The English parliament

by the 17th century had emerged as a vital source and voice
in the determining of public policy at an increasing degree
to the exclusion of the King.

Ilbert points out that

"parliamentary procedure (at the end of the 17th century)
followed the lines which it continued to retain until

^3Henry Elsynge, The Manner of Holding Parliaments in
England, (London; 1765)
Hakewel, Modus Tenendi Parliamentum, (London,

1671 )
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after the Reform Act of 1^32.,?^5
From the Long Parliament to 1&32, the most profound
changes are often considered to be in the growth and devel
opment of the cabinet in parliament and the emergence of
the party system.

Ilbert, commenting on the changes has

stated:
They were silent changes, not brought about by any
act of the Legislature; gradual in their operation;
developed, modified, deflected, retarded by strong
personalities', like Walpole, ■Pitt, George III; imper
fectly appreciated, misinterpreted, misunderstood.
In its way, the entire focus of parliamentary procedure
was altered in the nineteenth century.

The House came to

recognize that the great task of self government— fthat
excluded the one great power of the King— may well be deter
mined by the very rules that it employs to direct itself.
The new procedure of the 19th century was constructed with
the realization that perhaps the very continued exist
ence of a parliament rests on the correct solution of the
problems of procedure.

The new dimension to procedure

brought a'gout by party government, extensions of suffrage*;,
a mighty empire and in time the introduction of deliberate
obstructionism were such that procedure came to be recognized

"^Josef Redlich, The Procedure of the House of Commons,
(London: Archibald Constable Co., IVUbj, p. 11.
l6Ibid., XI.
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as a single problem upon which the survival of the system
may well have depended.
If there is any one origin from which the greater part
of parliamentary law has developed, it could only be termed
usage.

Indeed, there is a large body of practices that can

be traced to its origins; however, there is equally as great
a number of practices whose roots tend to evade us in the
light of a long passage of time.

Of the rules that have

survived to the present day, Stubbs has said,
Many are in the same form as they appear in earliest
parliamentary records.
Others are less easily dis
covered in the medieval chronicles and rolls, and
owe their reputation for antiquity to the fact that,
where they appear in later records, they have already
assumed the dignity of immemorial custom.^?
Of the multitude of devices that constitute procedure,
there exists in the background of each some moment when
it became identified as part of accepted parliamentary
procedure,
Many usages were crystallized, so to speak, by the
ruling of a speaker or by some formal action of
parliament, such as a resolution or simple vote.
New situations were met in the same way.
Thus,
came what we call precedents.
Out of these
have been formulated much of what we call
parliamentary l a w . ^
Not all precedents have survived, even after formal
adoption.

Many have been dropped for extreme reasons.

-^William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England.
(Oxford England: Clarendon Press, 1$73), P* 3$9, Vol. III.

lSLuce, op. cit. , p. 13®
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For instance, Hatsell, in what is considered to be the
first compilation of precedents (Published 1776), rejects
as precedents all the proceedings in both houses of parliament
from January 4, 1641,

(when the king, Charles I., went in

person to the house of commons, for the purpose of arresting
certain members), to the restoration.19
Although there is an aura of vagueness that is well
contained around the early development of many aspects of
procedure, modern parliamentary law is more concrete and
in the 20th century its sources are well established.
Specifically, modern parliamentary law is drawn mainly
from five sources:
1. Decisions of bodies 011 appeal.
2. Decisions of presiding officers on points of
order.
3. Decisions of courts.
4. Writings of authorities on parliamentary law.
5. Customs and u s a g e s . 20
If there is a key to the success of parliamentary law
which has lasted hundreds of years, and shows no signs of
growing old, it may well reside in the ability of the major
legislative houses to adapt the technique of its practice
and procedure to meet the demands and problems of each
generation.

l9Luther Cushing, Elements of the Law and Practice of
Legislative Assemblies, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1366), p. 3 0 &.
20paul Mason, j^ason’s Manual of Legislative Procedure
(New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1953), p. 53.

*
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Since parliamentary law is in a never ending state of
flux it differs greatly from the practice of deliberative
bodies of times past, both in America, and in England.
Parliamentary law is not determined by the rules or practices
in the House of Representatives of the United States, as
it is often mistakenly thought.

However, it should be

noted that there is a difference in general structures of
the procedure used in legislative bodies as constrasted with
small private bodies.
Their special requirements (large legislative
bodies) and the constantly increasing pressure of
their business have produced highly complex and
remarkably efficient systems peculiar to their
respective bodies but which are as a whole unsuited
to the needs of the ordinary assembly. As a result
there has been simultaneously developed through
years of experiment and practice a simpler system of
procedure adapted to the wants of deliberative
assemblies generally and which, though variously
interpreted in minor details by different writers,
is now in the main standardized and authoritatively
established.21
IV.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Definitions of many terms which will be used repeatedly
in this investigation are as follows-.
Parliamentary L a w :

Consists of the recognized rules,

precedents and usages of legislative, administrative, and
service bodies by which their procedure is governed and
determined.

Parliamentary Law is an organized system of

^ " R u l e s of Order'*, Encyclopaedia Britannlca. Vol. XIX.
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rules built on precedents and guided in its development
by the authority to make rules inherent in every deliberative
or legislative body.

22

Parliamentary Procedure or Practices.

The question is

often asked as to the difference between parliamentary law
and parliamentary procedure or practice.

The many authors

surveyed thus far acknowledge no difference and many use
the words interchangeably.

If any distinction should be

made in this study it is to this extent:

Parliamentary

law shall mean all the rules of procedure that have evolved
through history and have been accepted as legitimate
devices by having survived the tests of usage and the
courts.

Parliamentary procedure or practice should include

these rules but should also include any and all rules that '
any given group— private or legislative— may utilize.

Thus,

rules that are particular to a given group, that may never
have withstood a test b}*- the courts and yet are utilized
would simply be considered rule or rules of parliamentary
procedure or practice— but not necessarily parliamentary
law.
Bodies, Groups or Assemblies.

These refer to (1)

those groups of people elected or appointed as the offi
cial representatives of the people to function in a leg-

22 "Parliamentary Law”, ■■3ouvierts Law Dictionary*.-,
Rawle*s.Revision Vol. IV.
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islative manner, and (2) those groups of people formed
voluntarily for common interests, to reach a common goal
or explore a common subject.
Quorum.

Modern writers.:- on the subject of parliamentary

law, seemingly without exception, take cognizance of the
quorum as an extremely important aspect of procedure; as
such, it is usually stated as a general rule, for adequate a
and legal transactions of business.

Since each organiza

tion must determine its own quorum., it is rarely outlined
in specifics in the manuals.

The reason is quite obvious.

Unlike many other features of procedure a quorum requirement
cannot be stated in such a manner that would be binding on
all organizations.

Since no blanket quorum regulation is

capable of filling the needs of all assemblies, it is
regarded the duty of the persons constructing the organiza
tion’s constitution to set the requirement in such a way
that it will be realistic in light of the specific nature
of the organization.

Generally speaking, organizations

having a fluctuating number of members will select a per
centage as a quorum; those organizations with a fixed num
ber usually specify a definite number as a quorum.
The important feature to note here is that few organ
izations would elect to disregard the quorum.

To the

contrary, rare is the qroup that would choose to ignore such
an important safeguard.

The idea that some set number of

16
the whole body must be present before legal business can
be transacted seems to be well imbedded in our procedure.
However, there is much variation as to just what can or
should constitute a quorum.
Much of the controversy that has been historically
associated with the quorum can be traced to the problem
of simply determining just what is meant by a quorum.
"From the very earliest times it has been recognized as a
general rule that a majority of a group is necessary to act
for the entire group."23

In the case of a public body, the

power or authority which establishes the body may also
determine what constitutes a quorum.24

Sturgis states that

common parliamentary law fixes the quorum as a "majority of
the

m e m b e r s " .

The constitution of the United States sets

j

the,qubrum requirement in the House of Representatives at
a majority of the membership.

But to state that a quorum

is a majority of the membership opens the way to potential
conflict; which, is precisely what has happened on numerous
occasions.

Many writers on the subject of procedure will go

beyond this general definition and attempt a less restricted
one— ignoring the majority limitation.

The following are

selected definitions from some of the better known texts on

2% a s o n ,

op. cit., p. 61.

2^Ibid.

25
Sturgis, op. cit., p. 73-
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procedure:
1* A quorum is the number of members required to be
present to legally transact b u s i n e s s . 26
2. A quorum is the number of members required to be
present at a meeting in order that the assembly
may transact business. '
3. A quorum is the minimum, number of the members of
an organization which must be present at a meeting
in order to transact business l e g a l l y . °
4. A quorum in an assembly is the minimum number that
may be present to carry on business.29
In the above listed group of definitions there is no
key given as how to determine what is a minimum number nor
just what constitutes a majority.

Is a majority the,

(1)

total membership list, including (2) associate members and,
(3) including or excluding delinquent members?

Is the

majority computed on the basis of those (4) present and
voting, or,

(5) those present, voting and not voting, etc.?

These are the types of questions that have added to the
confusion of the quorum concept as it has been utilized
through history.

As we have emerged into the modern era, it

26Joseph O ’Brien, Parliamentary Law for the Laymen,
(New York; Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1952)", P* "28.
27\{envy M. Robert, Parliamentary Law, (New York:
Appreton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951h p. 356.
2^Sturgis, loc. cit.
29
• F.M. Gregg, Handbook of Parliamentary Law,
(Boston; Ginn and Comparer, 1910), p. 68.

-
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is not surprising that by now the method, which has been
legally agreed upon by the courts, to determine minimum and
majority, is well established.
Quorum. For the purpose of this study, a quorum shall
mean the rule of parliamentary law that requires some pre
determined parts of the entire body to be present before
business can be legally transacted.
Obstructionism.

The act, on the part of any individual

or group, of refusing to answer the quorum roll call, excepting
those individuals who are physically unable to do so.

i
.

;•

.CHAPTER II

j i'

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

A considerable amount of material on the subject of
parliamentary law has been written during the past several
hundred years.

Most of it can be classified as (1) those

materials that codify precedents in manuals to be utilized
in meetings of•various bodies to facilitate their business
and,

(2) "those publications that attempt to deal with

procedure as it has grown and developed in various bodies.
•Those of the second type may be commentaries on procedure,
official or unofficial records of proceedings in various
bodies such as the House of Commons or the United States
Senate or House, or general history books that include
procedure as a facet of history that mirrors the growth of
government.
Of those books in the first instance, almost without
exception, the treatment of the quorum is standard in that
rules governing its use are outlined for meetings or forming
constitutions.

The differences in the consideration of its

uses are only subject to change in light of the various
dates of publication.

Thus, a book on procedure which is

20
150 years old, i.e. Jefferson’s Manual,^ is less specific
as to the number of conditions regarding the use of the. quorum
than the Sturgis Code of Procedure,

(1 9 5 1 ).2--

The comparison

of the two indicates the vast change that has occurred in the
development of the quorum during the intervening years.
The list of manuals on procedure is far too vast to
allow a detailed examination of each.

However, there are

authors who require special mention since to some degree they
look beyond a simple statement of what the quorum is and
how it is utilized.

Most writers have pointed out standard

features of the quorum and go no further.
Since one of the purposes of this paper is to discover
the historical growth of the quorum, reference will be made
to those authors who deal with the historic aspect of the
quorum.

They are here presented in their historical

occurrence, starting with the most recent.
1. ' Mason’s ManuaJ. of Legislative Procedure.3

Mason

has divided the quorum into seven headings; each
is an outgrowth of precedents as determined by
i

1:the better known manuals.

For further support of

the precedents, he lists the legal decisions that

Ijefferson, Op. cit., p. 26.
^Sturgis, pp. cit,, p. 14.
^Mason, dp. cit.
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have occurred when any aspect of the quorum has
!j . been challenged to a court decision and inter*i
pretation.
His findings appear quite thorough
so far as he has gone.

The weakness in relation

ship to this study is that no interpretation of
the quorum is given outside of the strict reporting
of the American legal cases— and these only by
index number.

This is not surprising considering

the book is a manual for legislative bodies and
makes no pretense at an historical analysis.
2.

Sturgis Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure.4
Sturgis uses the same pattern as Mason.

Her

approach is to outline the present day rules re
garding the quorum and to refer each to one or
several legal cases that have in some way deter
mined the status of the quorum.

Once again there

is no concern or treatment of historical analysis.
3.

Robert Luce, in his book. Legislative Procedure,5
devotes time to a discussion of the historical
aspects of the quorum.

He views the quorum in

some detail as it progressed in this country in

^•Sturgis, bp. cit
'’Luce, op. cit.
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the New England, colonial and state legislatures.
He even goes so far as to discuss briefly the
guorum breaking rule of speaker Reed in the House
of Representatives in 1&90.

Too much of what

Luce offers is simply a narrative of several
incidents in American history, which although
interesting, lacks necessary depth, philosophy
or completion.

In its totality, Luce’s writing

does not come near the comprehensive study of the
quorum that is needed--or does it claim to;
Nevertheless, Luce has taken time to discuss the
quorum outside the usual reiteration found in
the manuals.

His work was an aid in the reporting

on the quorum in this paper; especially of value
is his reporting on early American Legislatures.
4

.

Luther Gushing in his work, Law and Practice of

]
-

’
f)
Legislative Assemblies,
offers a discussion of
'
" - "
the quorum in addition to stating quorum require
ments of the period.

His discussion is limited to

a short survey of various constitutional requir. ements for the quorum in many eastern states,
and also the status of the quorum in the national
houses.

His discussion of the English Houses is

only to mention the numbers required to constitute

6Cushing, pp. cit.
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a quorum of each.

The Work is a hundred years

old and is thus dated so far as recent developments
of the quorum— and parliamentary practice in general
are concerned.
In reviewing the literature of the second group,
there was found a wealth of material on the general develop
ment of both the English and American parliamentary govern
ments.

The Congressional Record and Globe are available for

the American government and Journals of the Lords and Commons
for the English government.

Tn the case of those events

that occurred in theae Houses before the start of their
Journal publications, the collections of debates and
proceedings are used.
Finally, there are several writers, who have dealt with
the quorum problem as it occurred in the House of Representa
tives in 1^90.

This is not unique since what occurred

culminated a problem that was centuries in building.
Further, any event that causes the House of Representatives
to lose all sense of order and. decorum'would probably be
widely commented upon.
■

•
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CHAPTER XII
METHOD OF PROCEDURE.
The niethod of pr-ocedure used in the study of the quorum
was the historical method.^
To accomplish the purpose of the study the following
procedure was used:
I. Materials relevant to the topic were gathered and
summarized according to the following categories: (1) origin
and chronology of the.quorum, (2) obstructionism and the
quorum, (3) modern American usages of the quorum.
II.

These materials were utilized to establish a philos

ophy of the quorum.
III.

Chapter IV presents the findings from this study

according to the following classification:
A. Origin and chronological development of the quorum
B. Obstructionism in the development of the quorum
C. Modern American usages of the quorum
D. Philosophy of the quorum, including basic premises
of parliamentary law in relationship to the quorum
IV. Chapter V presents the following;
A. Summary of the findings of the study
„ B. Recommendations for future usages of the quorum
C. Recommendations for further study

•^Ernest B. Bormann, Theory and Research in the Communic
ative Arts. {New York: Holt1, Rinehart and Winston, I n c . 19^5).
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C.

Recommendations for further study

Statements about the materials are made in this study.
These statements include judgments concerning human motives,
conclusions deduced from historical data, and implications
resulting from the various usages of the eruorum at different
times by different bodies*

CHAPTER IV
FINDINGSI HISTORY OF THE QUORUM
Origin and Chronological Development; Often a phenomenon
might in fact exist, but human failure to identify and acknowl
edge that existence does not diminish nor obviate it.

Such

has been the case with the parliamentary concept of the quorum
Long before attention was called to it, a form of the quorum
existed in the early meetings of the king and his councilors
in medieval England.

In a sense, the quorum as an-element

of parliamentary procedure, is almost as old as the parlia
ment of England itself.

Although not acknowledged as such

by modern standards, either by name or purpose, a form of
the quorum is evident as far back in English history as the
reign of Henry II (1154-&9)*

The "curia regis" or court of

law of that period maintained that no one was indispensable
to a court, "except its lord and such of his officials as
are required to transact its business,"I

'Aiis fragmentary

form of the quorum lasted but a short time as a result of the
new power structure of the nobility, brought about by the

1A. F. Pollard, Tiie Evolution of. Parliament. (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd, 1926), p. 27.
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Magna Carta.

This document of 1215 stated that the king

when he held his court, "is not therefore bound to summon
any particular persons to assist him.
As the king’s advisors took on a more independent role
in the operations of government during the next two centuries,
the status of the quorum concept becomes vague.

The Modus

Tenendi Parliamentum,3 one of the principle documents of
early procedure, seemingly contradicts itself on the quorum
concept.

In the discussion on the degrees of the peers,

the Modus points out that the parliament is composed of
six degrees and that if any of the degrees, "below the King
be absent, if they have been summoned by reasonable summonses
of Parliament, the Parliament shall nevertheless be considered
complete."^ The obvious implication is to the effect that
business may proceed provided adequate notice be given no
matter who attends.

In later discussion, however, the Modus

Zibid.
3 The main problem here is simply the lack of accurate,
extant records of the period.
The Modus is one of the most
complete documents cdncerning.'.'.procedure of the period but
its validity is in question.
The author is anonymous and
it appears at various times in somewhat unusual circumstances,
(Ibid., p. 433).
^Thomas D. Hardy (ed,), Modus Tenendi Parliamentum an
Ancient Treatise on the Mode of Holding the Parliament in
England (London: Eyre & Spottiswode), p. 24.
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spells out precisely what constitutes a quorum:
By this it is evident that the King can hold a
Parliament with the commons of his kingdom without
bishops, earls, and barons, provided they have been
summoned to parliament, although no bishop, earl, nor
baron obey the summons, because formerly there was
neither bishop, nor earl, nor baron, yet the Kings
held their Parliaments.5
The distinction here is clear; the newer social
classes of the earls, barons and bishops need not be present
for the legal transaction of business, provided the king
and his commons were present and the others simply notified.
The Modus goes on to explain why the commons must be
present and why the presence of the newer classes is not
needed for the proper transaction of business:
But still on the other hand, although the commons—
the clergy and laity— are summoned to Parliament,
as of right they ought to be, and for any cause will
not come, as if they pretend that the Lord the King
does not govern them as he ought, and assign special
cases in which he has not. governed them, then there is
no Parliament at all, even though the archbishops, and
bishops, earls, and barons, and all their peers, be
present with the King; and therefore it is needful that
all things which ought to be affirmed or abrogated,
granted or refused, or done by the Parliament ought to
be done by the commons of the Parliament which is com
posed of three degrees or orders of Parliament, to wit,
of the procurators of the clergy, the knights of shires,
commons of England, and not the nobles, because
every one of them is in the Parliament for his own person
and for none other.6

5Ibid., p. 42.
6Ibid.
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The commons then, composed by the clergy and laity, are of
such importance to the king that they must be present for
the proper transaction of business and thus constitute,
what in latter terms would be called a quorum.
The development of the quorum as a stated rule of proced
ure and given the name "quorum'1, is linked to the development '
of the office of the justice of the peace.

In the year

1327, Isabel, the wife of Edward II, contrived to depose her
husband and set his son Edward III upon the throne of England.^
In an effort to avoid the possibility of a popular uprising
and to maintain the peace, the new king ordered that "good '-7
men...should be assigned to keep the peace."^ After the
crises had passed, the office was retained and within twenty
years, the additional power of trying felonies was given
the "conservators, wardens, or keepers of the peace."

An

order, which appears as an effort to control the justices
themselves, was enacted in the year 1 3 4 4 and according to 0
Cross, who stated, "any two or more were intrusted with
limited judicial functions."9

The requirement of "any two

or more" seems an outgrowth of liberties and abuses of power

7 David Hume, The History of England, (Boston: Adline
publishing Co., Vol. II), p. 154*
% i r William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England, ed. W. G. Hammond (San Francisco: Bancroft-Whiteny
Co., 1^90), ^ook I, p. 351
9Arthur L. Cross, A Shorter History of England and
Greater Britain. (New York: MacMillan Co.’, 1929), p. 142

30
taken by some of the conservators and that in an effort to
discourage such activities, more than one justice was required
for the proper transaction of business.
Under the circumstances, this requirement was apparently
devised in an effort to have the justices keep check on
one another.

This restriction seems to have failed to bring

about the end of power abuses as indicated by a statute
enacted by Richard II which states, "that none shall be made
justice of the peace for any gift, brocage, fauover, or
affection....'i1®
To further keep men of dubious scruples from becoming
justices it was enacted in statute Richard 12.C.10., that the
justices, "be of the best reputation and most worthy men
in the country ."1 1
The parliamentry device of requiring more than one justice
to be present for the legal transaction of business, was not
called'the "quorum".

This term was devised during the same

period but in conjunction with another aspect to the office
of justice of peace.

The word "quorum was first used to

name a select number of justices, known for their outstanding
ability to be of the "quorum".

The Eirenarcha by Lambard

states'*

10William Lambard, Eirenarcha or The Office of the
Justice of the Peace, in Two Books: Gathered in 1579 and
published 1 5 & 1 > p. 3 3 *

11

Blackstone, Loc. cit.
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In the choice of the wardens and justices of
the Peace, the Statute lawes have respecte to- the manners
and ahilitie (or Livelihoode) of them all, and to the
skill and learning of suche as are speciallie selected,
and therefore named of the Quorum.I 2
Despite the efforts of Richard II to keep the justices
honest, it was apparently felt an attempt to upgrade the
justice courts and to further check the unscrupulous justices,
it was enacted during the reign of Henry VII (1457-1509) by
statute II, c.2 s.5* "of the Justices of the peas whereof
one shall be of the quorum."^3

Thus the quorum during this

period referred to the membership of the select few justices
who were appointed to that standing, and were mentioned in
terms that denoted their status:

"againe, Justices of the

Peace (especiallye those of the Quorum) form hencefoorthe....
The Lawmakers during the reign of King Henry VII must have
felt the chances of honest proceeding in the justice courts
would be improved if at least one justice was of the quorum.
The parliamentary device of requiring more than one justice
to be present for the legal transaction of business, was
not called the "quorum"— there was no name for this rule.
The quorum then, simply referred to that certain number
of justices of the peace, of eminent learning, or ability,
whose presence in addition to the other justices, was

12

Lambard, loc. cit.

•^james Murry (ed.), A New English Dictionary on
Historical Principles, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Vol. VIII).
^Ibid.
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necessary to constitute a bench.

The Justices were appointed

by _a special commission of the king under the great seal,
the form of which was settled by all of the Judges in 1590.
This appoints them all,
...Jointly and severally,to keep the peace, and any
two or more of them to inquire of and determine
felonies and other misdemeanors:
in which number
some particular Justices, or one of them are
directed to be always included, and no business to be
done without their presence.15
The actual working is recorded in the Eirenarcha by
Lambard, and is as follows:

"quorum aliquem vestrum,

A.B.C.D. etc. unum esse volumus," (of whom we will that
A.B.C.D. etc. be one).l 6

word"quorum" is derived

from the Latin "who" and means "of whom".

Formerly it

was sometimes stated as "corum"; in each instance the
word is the plural genitive of "who".
The order requiring more than one Justice be present
for the legal transaction of business and thus requiring
one to be of the quorum, became neglected as in time all
Justices became of the quorum. ^

In 1753 the custom of

advancing all Justices to the quorum became codified into
law by George II.
...be it enacted by the King's most excellent

l^Blackstone, loc. cit.
■^Lambard, loc. cit.
17Blackstone, loc. cit.
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Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the
lords spiritual and temporal and commons in the
present parliament assembled, and by authority
of the same, That...no act, order, adjudication,
warrent, indenture of apprenticeship, or hereafter
to be made, done or executed, but two or more
justices of the peace, which doth not express
that one or more of the justices is or are of the
Quorum, shall be impeached, let aside or vacated,
for that defect only, any law, statute or usage
to the contrary not-withstanding.lti
Since more than one justice was necessary for the proper
transaction of business, and that, all justices be of the
quorum, these two requirements became synonymous, and
the word "quorum" took on its present day meaning.
T h e 'emergence of the quorum in the House of Commons
as an adopted rule of procedure occurred.on January 5>
1640. ' On that day the House resolved, "that Mr. Speaker
is not to go to his chair till there be at least forty
in the House."19

From that time the rule has been intact

and no attempts have been made to change the quorum concept*
There have, however, been attempts to change the number
required, despite statements to the contrary by many
authors in the field.

An attempt was made in the commons

to change the quorum requirement from forty to sixty on
March 18, 1801.

The motion failed.^0

In fact in

•^Danby Pickering, Statutes at Large, from the 26-30
Year of King George I I ., ( London: Joseph Bentham, 1 7 6 6 },
stat. 2b Geo. II C. 27.
19c. H. Parry, The Parliaments and Councils of England,
(London: John Murray, 1839), P» 3^5.
20i,uther Cushing, Elements of the Law and Practice of
Legislative Assemblies^ (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1866), p. 95.

3^
reference to the number necessary to constitute a quorum
in both the commons and lords, there has been a diversity
of statements among well-informed writers.

Cushing lists

the discrepancies in his book on legislative procedure*
Judge Story, (Com. on Const.II. 295) says that
the number of forty-five constitutes a quorum to do
;ibusiness in the house of commons. And he adds, in a
. note, 'I have not been able to find, in any books
within my reach, whether any particular quorum is
required in the house of lords.'
Chancellor Kent, (Com. I, 235* note b , ) says*
'In the English house of commons, forty members
used to form a quorum for business, but in 1 8 3 3 »
the requisite number was reduced to twenty.*
The authors of a French work— Confection of
'des Lois. (1839)* P» 1-6 3 9 — having spoken of forty
members as a quorum of the house of commons, adds,
in a note, that the number is now fixed at twenty.
The notion, that the quorum of the commons
;had been reduced from forty to twenty, arose from
the fact, that in the years 1 8 3 3 and 1 8 3 ^-, the house
met for the transaction of private business at
three o'clock, and at five, proceeded to the
public business as before; the quorum for the two
hours devoted to private business was fixed at
twenty members; leaving the quorum for the general
business of the house at forty, as it had been
established by usage time out of mind. This ar
rangement for private business was not renewed after
1 8 3 ^ . 21

Why the number forty was adopted has given rise to
speculation by some authors.

Laundy states, "It has been

suggested! that this number was chosen because it coincided
with the number of counties into which England was divided

21Ibid

at that

t i m e .

"22

Townsend goes farther when he quotes the

same reason as that given by Laundy from Dwarris on the
Statutes but then adds, "The number was most probably chosen
by accident, as the fitting medium between rigour and
laxity, Just sufficient to insure a fair hearing, without
taxing too severely the attention of honourable members."23
"The origin of the number three as a quorum of the House of
Lords, " states Cushing, "undoubtedly arose from a principle
of the Roman Law, that three persons suffice to make a college
collegium, equivalent to our word corporation, in most of
its legal features." 2 ^Before the quorum was adopted as a constant rule of
procedure in the parliament, there was an occasion when
the house dismissed for what ostensibly was a quorum
failure.

The date was April 20, 1607, thirty-three years

before the formal adoption of the quorum, that, "no Bill
was read this day, and the house arose at ten o'clock,
'being not above threescore.'
not then a sufficient number.

It seems that sixty was
25

22philip Laundy, The office of Speaker. (London:
Spottiswoode, Ballantyne & Co., 19bK) 9 P« 206.
23w. C. Towsend, History of the House of Commons
from 1688 to 1 8 3 2 , (London: 1843, Vol. II), p. 3^5.
214- Cushing, loc. cit.
25j0hn Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings in the
House of Commons with Observations,(2nd ed.'I London:
H. Hughs, 1784, Vol. II), p. 127.
•
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To this day the exact reasoning and oral discussion—
if any* that occurred in respect to quorum rule of 1640,
are not known.

The general motivation of the house on

that day, however, has given rise to different interpre
tations.

Josef Redlich, maintains the motive was "the

desire of the Puritan majority to protect themselves
against surprise vote during the hours of slack attendance
in the early part of the setting."2^

Towsend, in his

Memoirs of the House of Commons, states that the
quorum rule was, "certainly intended to prevent questions
being carried by surprise and in a thin

house."27

Hatsell

maintains the same reasoning and further states, "that it
is essential to the fairness of proceeding."2^
Indeed, 1640 was a tumultuous year in England.

Not

only was there strife between the commons and the throne
on political grounds, there also existed.strife in the
area of theology.

This religious strife was hot restricted

to the heirarchy of government; the nation as a whole
had been divided for years over religious differences.
The opposing forces of Catholic tradition and Puritan
earnestness were contending within the area of Church

Josef Redlich, The Procedure of the House of
Commons. (London: Archibald Constable Co., I 9 0 B,Vol.II), p. 75*
27Townsend, loc. cit.
^Hatsell. op. cit.. p. 124.

life; within the area of political life the two opposing
forces of absolutism and desire for popular government,
were struggling.^

The king represented the established

church of England, and absolutism, the parliament was
strongly Puritan and represented the desired popular
government.

As intense as the religious problem was in

the land, there is little reason to suggest that within
the House of Commons there were religious factions
quarrfeling.
throne.

It seems all effort was directed toward the

So strong was this feeling of hostility of the

Puritan parliament toward the king and established church,
the house between December 18, and December 24, 1640,
accused Laud, "Archbishop of Canterbury, of High Treason."
In addition to Laud, ten of the most prominent bishops
and judges were accused of crimes ranging,^ from treason of
idolatry and superstltJohQ^?

Such action left no doubt

as to the feeling of the commons toward the church and
king.

It should be pointed out that not all the members

of the commons agreed to the hostility a s ‘some remained
firm in their support of the kings
When the dominant party in the commons deter
mined to destroy Episcopacy, Falkland and Seldon

29h .D. Traill and J.S, Mann (ed.), Social England
(New Yorks G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1909* Vol IV, Section I.),
P. 57.
3 0 parry>

p-p. cit.. p. 3 45.
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stood aside from Hampden and Pym. Hyde, to whom
the Church appeared as a safeguard of order and
decent devotion, and Falkland, whose foresight
showed him that the Church, not Puritanism, was
the defender of intellectual liberty, drew sword
for 'Church and king.'"3i
Actually, the hostility of Charles I toward the
parliament was a strong force in drawing the commons
together in a tight unified group.

Considering there

were 504 members of commons, the"Angelican Reaction" of
Falkland and Seldon was very limited.
The assertion made by the previously mentioned
authors concerning a surprise vote in the early days of the
Long Parliament, seems doubtful.

This period in the house

was marked by extremely strong Puritan strength and the
possibility of any minority— if there really was a
significant one at this time— to attain a surprise vote,
seems remote.
A far more reasonable explanation and one that seems
a natural out-growth of previous developments, is
that the house was in need of a device to encourage
attendance and aid in maintaining order.
1640 when the Long Parliament convened.

It was November 3*
With the exception

of the brief Short Parliament there had been no meeting of
parliament since l629o

The new parliament was anxious- to

3^Traill and Mann, op. cit., p. 50.
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declare and discuss the misrule-" of-the king and get .
about its business.

However, soon after the Long

Parliament settled to work the old problem of gathering and
holding a house began to plague the organization.

As far

back as December 18, 1621 when "Mr. Secretary moveth, that
at a certain hour we proceed to business, whether the house
be full or not,"33 the ability of gathering and holding
a house had been a problem.
restricted to the commons;

This problem had not been
on July 8, 1625 the new monarch,

Charles I noticed, "the thinness of the House of Lords and
i

signifies his pleasure that those present shall not depart."3^
In the. commons on July 1 1 , 1625 it was ordered, "...the censure
of the house shall pass upon all such as be absent."35

By

June 2, 1628, the problem of gathering and holding a house
was severe enough for the commons to order that:
The House be called, and no excuses made till ■
the House is fully called, and then to be heard.
The forfeitures to be disposed as the House shall
think fit; and if any failing, and his. excuse not
allowed, a Serjeant-at-Arms to be sent for him to
come to the House to answer:
and after the House 05
called over, the defaulters to be presently called.

-^Godfrey Davies, The Early Stuarts l603-l660,
(London: Oxford University Press, I9 5 2 ), p. 9 7 .
33parry, op. cit., p. 2 9 1 .
3^Ibid., p. 3 0 2 .
35ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 3 1 1 .
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Even this measure seemed unable to force an adequate
attendance, thus only three days later the commons ordered:
Whoever is absent without leave on call of the
House, shall pay L 10, at least. Upon question,
all such members as, by information to the House,
without a call, shall appear to absent the service
of the House, by going out of town, shall incur the
like p e n a l t y . 37
The parliament of 1 6 2 9 was the last parliament called
by the king until 1640 when the Short Parliament met for
a period of about one month.

The parliament of 1 6 2 9 was

dissolved March 10, yet as late as January 30, "it is
ordered, in the Commons, that no man go out of the House
during the sitting of the grand Committee, without licence,
upon censure, "38

and on February 11, less than two weeks

later, "ordered in the Commons, every member to attend,
and none to go out of town."39

a few days later the

parliament was dismissed and did not meet again until 1640.
The procedural problem attendent with gathering and holding
the house was. left unsolved, as no device had been put into
effect to eliminate it.
During the Short Parliament the topic was not considered
but only three days after the opening;; of the Long Parlia
ment on November 5> 1640, the house became involved in a

” 37Ibid.
'

3 8 rbid.,

p. 3 2 8 .

39ibid,t p. 3 3 0 .
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lengthy debate and an order was made, "that the door
be shut and none suffered to go out, (a very rare practice)."4®
Still no relief was gained by the working members to hold
a house, so bn December 4, 1640, it was ordered, "That
whoever does not take his place, or moves out of it to the
disturbance of the house, shall pay 1 2 d, to be divided between
the Serjeant and the poor ."4 1

At last, what appears as

a final stroke to keep a minimal, acceptable house, it was
ordered on January 5> 1640, "that Mr. Speaker is not to go
to his chair, till there be at least forty members in the
House ."4 2
There can be no doubt that basic parliamentary procedure
was being evolved during this period and the order of
January 5* 1&40 came as a natural out-growth of the previous
efforts of the house to keep its members— or some set number
of them in attendance.

The rule was ordered during the

tenure of Speaker Lenthall who introduced various rules for
the preservation of order without which, "many a sitting
of the Long Parliament whould have collapsed in chaos and
»43
uproar. J

Lenthall's reaction to the erratic attendance

4 oIbid.,

p. 341.

4 lIbid«,

p. 344.

4 2 Ibid.,

p. 345.

4 3Laundy,

loc. cit.
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habits of the parliament, was such that two months after
the parliament had been in session— about the time of the
quoruih resolution— he found reason to complain of, "the conduct
of' members so unworthy to sit in parliament that could rim
forth for their dinners, or to the playhouses and bowling
alleys, leaving business of great w e i g h t . " ^

Townsend,

in addition to this, remarks about a "thin house" stating
further that quorum rule was a safeguard "required to correct
the general laxity of discipline and attendance whi’
oh suc
ceeded the Restoration."24'-*

It is interesting to note that

the majority in the most numerous house during the reign
of Charles I consisted Of two only, 1 76 to 17^-.

Even this

full house of 3 5 0 left still a third w a n t i n g . ^
With the few exceptions noted earlier the house of
January 16^0 was not factionallzed, at least during the
early months of that year; thus, the quorum order of that
day was probably geared to force attendance.

The majority

was essentially undivided and the threat of a surprise
vote at that time seems doubtful.

It may well have been

the case that some members saw eliminated in this motion
the ability of any extremely smaill house to carry a

w iMa.

^Townsend, loc. cit.
LlA

.

.

Townsend, op. cit.. p. 366
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surprise vote but if such sentiment existed there is little
reason to believe that it was discussed.

It is quite possible,

however,' that many of the members of the house might have
considered the order of January 5, 1640 as a method of
protecting majorities and minorities.
Quorum Usage in the American Colonies:

The utilization of

the quorum in the proceedings of the first colonies was or
dered by the government of England before that government
imposed such a regulation upon itself.

There are many reasons

that can be conjectured as to why this procedural device was
used— or imposed— on the colonies.

Perhaps the most reason

able is simply that the colonies were no more than branch
offices of a trading company far removed from the eye of the
main office in London; as such, the company a's well as the
throne and commons, desired influence by any means possible,
including dictating the form of internal proceedings their
councils were to use.

A device'such as a quorum could be

indispensable in stemming the power of any one man or group.
For instance, the charter of the Massachusetts Bay of
1629, states,
...and that the said Governor, Deputie Governor, and
assistants of the saide Company, for the tyme being,
shall or maie once every Month, or oftener at their
Pleasures, Assemble and Houlde and keepe a Courte or
Assemblie of themselves, for the better ordering and
directing of their Affaires, and that any seaven or
more persons of the assistants, together with the
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Governor, or Deputie Governor soe assembled, shalbe
saide, taken, held and reputed to be, and shalbe a
full and sufficient Courte or Assemblie of the said
Company, for the handling ordering, and despatching
of all such Buysiness and Occurrents as shall from
tyme to tyme happen.4 '
The charter continued, calling for "greater and general
Courts" scheduled through the year, and specified that,
...The Governor or Deputie Governor and six of the
Assistants and Freeman of the saide Company as shalbe
present, or the greater nomber of them so assembled,
whereof the Governor or Deputie Governor and six of the
Assistants of the least to be seaven, shall have full
powe^gand authoritie to choose, nominate, and appointe,
etc.
In the commission of Sir Ednumd Andros appointing him
"Captain General and Governor in Chief in and over all
that part of pur territory and dominion of New England in
A m e r i c a , " ^ a charter, signed by James II, makes specific
reference to the quorum.

The power given Andros was restrict

ed for the most part to the "advise and consent of our
said Council...any five whereof we do hereby appoint to be a
Quorum."

50

Just why the quorum number was changed from

seven to five for the Colonial Council, raises questions
that require too much speculation to.be considered here.

hr?
'U. S., Congress, House, American Charters Constitutions
and Organic Laws, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1906, House Doc.5190
Vol. 37 P. 1^53.
^ 8 Ibid.

49ibid.
5°lbid., p. 1 9 6 3 .
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It should be noted, however, that the charter of 1 6 2 9 had
been cancelled by a judgment of the high court of Chancery
of England, June of 168^1-.

The Andros commission was a charter

specifying the nature of power and government in the colonies
during the interim years until 1 6 9 1 when the government was
reorganized under the charter of that year.

The charter

specified that the "Governour of our Province..assemble and
call together the Councillors or Assistants..Seaven of them at
the least shall and may from time to time hold and keep a
Council for the ordering and directing the Affaires of our
said P r o v i n c e . T h i s particular quorum requirement was
one quarter of the total body since the charter calls for
a total of "eight and Twenty Assistants or Councillors."
This particular group became the upper body of the government
and as a result of a statute of October 1 6 9 2 , which formed
a branch with a quorum requirement that stated, "Forty
/

representatives at any time so assemblied shall be accounted
i
a number sufficient to constitute a House,...and do any
business proper to be done in that h o u s e . I t

can be

assumed that the number was selected to conform to the
requirement of 1640 in the English House of Commons.

The

Massachussetts Constitution of 1780* written after the.
revolution, calls for "not less than sixty members of the

^ibid., p, 1878.
52Luce, op. cit., p. 24.
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house of representatives shall constitute a quorum for
doing business," and, "Not less than sixteen members of the
senate shall constitute a quorum for doing

bu sin ess .

"53

On the other hand the charter of Maryland in 1 6 3 2 whichwas granted to Lord Baltimore, contained no quorum regulation.
The charter remained in force until the revolution of 1776
when a new constitution of that year stated, "that not less
than a majority of Delegates...constitute a

H o u s e .

"54

The

constitution of 1 8 6 7 reaffirms the majority as a quorum.
In the Province of New Hampshire the royal commission
simply stated that, in order to make laws, statutes and
ordinances, "the consent of the governor and the major part
of both houses was necessary."55

Precisely what constituted

a quorum was apparently never mentioned as indicated by an
entry!made in the Provincial Papers in July 1 6 9 6 , when
it was asked "whether three of the assembly was a. house
and could adjourn and whether it was legal,"

to which the

house replied that, "there was no prefixed number appointed
and that it was legal."5^

No mention of a quorum was made

until 1745 when from that time on the number was regularly

•^House Document, on. cit.. p. 1 8 9 8 .
5^lbid.. p. 1 6 9 2 .
55william H. Pry, New Hampshire as a Royal Province3
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), p.. 146.
56 lbid.
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specified in the rules adopted by every succeeding assembly
at its first assembly.

Still the number fluctuated in

relationship to the growth of the number of representatives.
Thus, in 1745, when the house consisted of twenty members,
the speaker and at least eleven members had to be present
before business could be transacted.

In 17^2, when there

were thirty-one present, it was voted that the speaker
and fifteen members should constitute a quorum.

In 1771,

when the house consisted of thirty-four members, the quorum
consisted of the speaker and sixteen members, while in 1 7 7 5 ,
it was still further increased, embracing the speaker and
eighteen members.57
Rhode Island, settled in 1 6 3 6 , by Roger Williams,
received its first charter from the king in
does not discuss any quorum requirement:

1643.

The charter

however conflict

over the matter must have occurred because in 1 6 7 2 the rep
resentatives damanded a degree of autonomy given the English
House of Commons.

A resulting reform bill included that,

In all weighty matters, wherein the King's honor is
most Jeoparded...the Assembly shall be the major part
of the Deputies belonging to the whole collony, as there
must be.the major part of the Assistants (by the charter).
Butt otherwise, such said act (if made without-the
greater part of the Deputies present) such said act
shall be voyd and of none e f f e c t . 5 o

57ibid.
58;Luce, op. cit., p. 2 5 .
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There was,however, a quorum requirement in the lesser
town government of Providence, Rhode Island, as early as
October 2, l655» as Indicated by an excerpt of the town record,
First all actionab [sic] Cases shall be tried by
‘Towriesman as'in ye Nature of a Jury; Yet with ye
libertie of not being Put on Swearing, and these 6 ,
men to be Princed downe by ye Towne quarterly, and
warned 3 days before the Court by ye Seargeant to be
ready at ye day and hower appointed Vender ye Penaltie
of 3 for ye Neglect.
6

The idea of a majority constituting a quorum in Rhode
Island has remained constant and is specifically stated as
a requirement in the constitution of 1842.
The Carolinas are good examples of where the crown’s
officials attempted to maintain control of the colonies by
refusing them the power to regulate their own rules and
procedure.

Under proprietary regulations the quorum was

held at one third, significantly higher than forty
required in the house of commons.

In South Carolina in

t

I?l 6 , ,a statute set the quorum at sixteen, slightly more
1i

than half of the total membership of thirty-one.

In 1719»

the number of representatives was raised to thirty-six
and the quorum to nineteen.

&0

When the house grew to

forty-eight, nineteen was nearly forty percent of the
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The Early records of the Town of Providence. (Provid
Snow Farnham Printers) Vol. II, p. 8 5 .

6®Jaok P. Greene, The Quest for Power.(Williamsburg,
Virginia* University of North Carolina Press, 1963)p* 217.
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house, which caused occasional complaints:
Governor James Glen wrote in 1748 that the size of
the quorum often created 'many obstructions and delays.
A Party of pleasure made by a few of the Members,' he
lamented, 'renders it often impossible for the rest
to enter upon Business, and sometimes I have seen a
Party made to go out of Town purposely to break the
House as they call it (well knowing that nothing could
be transacted in their Absence) and in this manner to
prevent the Success of what they could not otherwise
oppose.'
In 1756 the Board of Trade also contended
that the size of the established quorum,'put it into
the power of any one or two factious Member(s) who
have an Influence in His Majesty's service and the
Publeck good of the Province by prevailing upon others
to absent themselves.’ The Board suggested that
Governor Lyttilton alter.the situation, but neither
he nor his successors made any effort to do so.
In North Carolina, the Fundamental Constitution of 1 6 6 9
provided that a quorum should consist of not less than half
of the total members .6 2

The royal governor complained that

a majority was too high for a quorum as it was much more diff
icult for the governor to control from twenty-five to thirtyfive members than f i f t e e n . ^

Attempts were made by a succession

of governors starting with Johnston in 1746 when he attempted
to reduce the number to

The issue was not
*
resolved and in November 1 7 6 0 , the house adopted a resolution
fifteen.
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6 lIbid.

^^House Document, op. cit., p. 2 7 8 2 .
63c. E. Raper, North Carolina. (New York:
1904), p. 2 1 8 .
Greene, op. cit.. p. 218.
•■:i;

MacMillan Co.,

50
reaffirming the majority rule.

Governor Dobbs was power

less to enforce his quorum requirement of fifteen members
because the lower house simply declined to act unless a
65
maj'ority were present.
The house used the quorum issue
to exert its independency and seldom allowed the number as
designated by the crown to be the actual one.
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Thus in

effect, the house denied the royal authority power to regulate
its internal proceedings in regard to a quorum and succeeded
in enforcing a provision of their own.
In the original charter for the Province of Pennsylvania,
in l68'l, given to William Penn, no mention of a quorum is
made,

However, one year later in Penn's Charter of Liberties

granted by the king, a provincial council of 7 2 persons was
to meet yearly.

The council composed of persons "moste noted

for their Wisdom, Virtue and Ability"— was subject to the
following:

"not lesse than Two Thirds of the whole Provincial

Council shall make a Quorum and that the Consent and appro*
bation of Two Thirds of said Quorum shall be had in all
*
such Cases or matters of Moment."

However for routine

business it was ordered that, "...in all cases and matters
of lesser mement Twenty-four members of the said Provincial
Council shall make a quorum, The Majority of which four

65Ibid.
66Raper,' op. cit., p. 222.
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and Twenty shall and may always determine on such Cases,
and Causes of Lesser M o m e n t . T h e

clause for minor

business was excluded in the Charter of Privileges of 1701
and replaced by a requirement of “Two Thirds of the Whole
Number that ought to meet .'’^ 8

As the colonial charter

gave way to a constitution in 1 7 7 &, the unique requirement
of two-thirds was continued— but unlike the charter of
1701,

the constitution neglects to define which two-thirds:

of those present or of the total enrollment of the body.
The omission, as well as the large number, must have caused
concern for all subsequent constitutions (of which there
were three) require a reduced quorum of a majority with
a provision for a non-quorum to adjourn to locate absent
members
The lands of present day New York, previous to 1777*
were in charters of other colonies, including Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania and grants to the Duke of York.

New York,';/

until 1 7 7 1 , appears to have been exempt from quorum difficulties.
.However, in that year the crown’s Instructions to Governor
William Tryon stated:

^ H o u s e Document, op. cit., p. 3 0 ^8 .
6 8 Ibld..

p. 3078.

6 9 Ibld..

p. 309^.
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And although by our commission aforesaid* we have
thought fit to direct that any three of the members of
our said council make a quorum* it is nevertheless our
will and pleasure that you do not act with a quorum
of less than five members* unless upon extraordinary
emergencies when a great number cannot conveniently
be had.70
The council had eleven members; after the revolution erupted*
New York framed a constitution calling for a majority quorum;
this same requirement remained in all subsequent constitutions.71 '
One of the earliest charters was that which established
the colony of Virginia.

The early charters were quite

specific on the quorum matter.
1 6 1 I-I 2

For instance the charter of

stated:

The’Treasurer* Company of Adventureres and Planters...
Keep a court and Assembly...the Treasurer or his Deputy*
to be always one* and the Number.of fifteen others...
shall be sufficient Court...for dispatching casual and
particular Occurrences* and accidental Matters of less
Consequence...72
The above provision is for the handling and ordering of
matters of less consequence; however* the subsequent paragraph
of the charter sets up a more formidable quorum requirement
for "affairs of greater Weight and Importance...the said
Treasurer and Company or the greater Number of them* so
assembled* shall and may have full Power and Authority..."73

70jQU C e ^

op. cit., p. 2 7 .

^ H o u s e Document* op. cit.* p. 2 6 2 3 .
72Il3id<> V. lls p# 3 8 0 5 .

73jbid.
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This charter was issued to the colony of Virginia thirty
years before the English House requirement of 1640.

The

latter requirement can only be termed a majority requirement
which was repeated in future houses.

The Virginia Constitution

of 1 7 7 6 creates a two house legislature with a majority of
the twenty-four members of the senate a quorum but the
document fails to provide a quorum for the house.

74

This

apparent oversight was remedied in the constitution of 1 8 3 0
and the quorum has remained a majority for both houses since.
In addition to the colonies mentioned, there is little
that differs in the early charters and constitutions of the
few remaining colonies in respect to the quorum.

There is

a very definite limit to the extent to which the procedure
of one body can serve as a model for another.

Yet by the

close of the colonial years of American history, all of the
colonies had some form of quorum requirement.

Not all the

legislatures had adopted the rule of a majority quorum but
it was adopted by most of them.

Pennsylvania and Vermont

both reduced their quorum requirements from two-thirds to a
simple majority by 1790* South Carolina, Georgia and
i
Massachusetts were the only States permitting less than a
majority to do business and all three have abandoned the
7c
practice.
It should be noted that the House of Commons

f^Ibid.,
75

p. 3 8 1 6 .

Luce, op. cit., p. 28.
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and the Crown, as the creating bodies for colonial charters,
one time only, imposed the same quorum requirement on a
i
l< 't

colony as the one imposed on themselves; further, the quorum
impositions were, for the most part, imposed on the colonies
before the English house adopted its own.
The Quorum Rule and the Federal Constitution: By the latter
half of the 18th Century, the quorum had permeated the coun
cils and legislatures of America as an established function
of procedure.

As such, it is not surprising that it became

an item of concern in the drafting of a Federdl Constitution.
It was into August of 1?8? before the delegates to the
Federal Constitutional Convention came to the problem of the
quorum.

It was handled with dispatch and the deliberations

lasted but a short time.

Article VI, Section 3» of the pro

posed constitution stated, "In each House a majority of the
members shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day."'

The following

acoount of the deliberations, taken wholly from James Madison’s
notes (the only authoritative, extant source), recounts
Nathaniel Ghorum, delegate from Massachusetts, opposing the
motion because, "less than a Majority in each House should
be a Quorum, otherwise great delay might happen in busi
ness and great

inconveniences from the future increase

^ J a m e s Madison, Debates In the Federal Convention of
1787. (ed.) Hunt & Scott, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1920), p. 339.

of members.
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Mercer of Maryland concurred, and added that

"so great a number will put in the power of a few by seceding
at a critical moment to introduce convulsions, and
the government.7®

endanger

Mercer favored leaving it to the legislature

to fix their own :quorum

the same as in the English house

and thus keep it at a small number.

Mason from Virginia

countered with the argument that less than a majority quorum
would be, "dangerous to the distant parts to allow a small
number of members of the two Houses to make laws," and
that the "Central States could always take care to be on the
Spot and by meeting earlier than the distant ones, or wearing
their patience, and outstaying them could carry such measures
as they pleased."

King from Massachusetts retorted that

such might be the case but he was of the opinion, "that
public inconvenience..was more to be dreaded.",

Governor

Morris from Pennsylvania moved to fix the quorum at thirtythree members in the House and fourteen in the Senate which
was a majority of the time.

King amended this to have

fourteen and thirty-three the lowest numbers but, "leaving
the Legislatures at liberty to increase them or not."
Elseworth of Connecticut, Wilson of Pennsylvania and Gerry
of Massachusetts, noted that seventeen would be a majority
out of a quorum of thirty-three and eight of fourteen, hence

7 7 Ibid.,
7 8 Ibid.

p. 3 7 6 .

I
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questions might possibly be carried by as few as two large
states and in the senate with the aid of two small states.79
The motion as amended was defeated nine to two and the
original carried with the additional wording, requested by
Randolph and Madison, of, "and may be authorized to compel
attendance of absent members in such manner and under such
penalties as each house may provide . " ® 0
ment was made to the quorum.

One further amend

It was moved by Madison that

the right of expulsion was too important to be excercised
by a, "bare majority" and that two-thirds should be required.
The motion passed but not without opposition from Governor
Morris who felt that the power could safely be trusted to
a majority and that to require more would invite abuses
from the minority.

Despite Morris's objection the motion

carried . ® 1
The nature of the debate over the quorum reflected the
attitudes, fears and interests of the period as much as a
concern for proper procedure.

From the debate it appears
%
the compelling reason why a smaller number than a majority
of the members of each house should not be permitted to
make laws, was to be found in the extent of the country and

79ibid., p. 3 7 7 .
®°Ibid., p. 378.
8 lIbid.
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the diversity of its interests.

Thus the concern was the

possibility of the central states being "on the spot" and
the distant states precluded from legislative deliberations.
A further consideration is that sectional cleavages, were
not manifest in the quorum as much as the fear of the small
states being domineered by the large ones— thus, the rejection
of Morris's motion.
Unfortunatly and despite good intentions, the quorum
provision that was placed in the constitution had several
built-in problems that were to plague the Senate and House
of Representatives off and on for the next one hundred
years.

The actual concept of a required number present for

the legal transaction of business was well permeated into
American procedural practice by the termination of the
revolutionary period.

It is not surprising then, that the

states would, with slight exception include a quorum
requirement in their own constitutions.

Thomas Jefferson

in his manual of procedure which he designed^for the new
states of America, advocated a quorum and referred to
Hatsell for his precedent.
Indeed then, the quorum by the eighteenth century was
a fundamental aspect of parliamentary procedure, well
imbedded in the state constitutions.

The potential problems

inherent in a simple majority quorum were not to errupt to
any great extent until the latter half of the eighteenth
century.
t

This is not to say however, that some forms of
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quorum obstruction had not already taken place.

Since dach

house of the American Congress defines its own set of
procedures, and each is accorded high respect by the citizens
of America, it was perhaps a degree of good fortune that the
major problems concerning the quorum were resolved for the
American people in such august bodies.

Further definitions

of the quorum were made by the courts of this country with
strong ramifications for private organizational procedure.
The new modifications that were necessary in utilization
of the quorum were for the most part brought about by the
need to .eliminate obstructionism that had slowly been
developing in this country.
Obstructionism and the Quorumt

Obstructionism in parliamentary

procedure is a relatively modern problem.

Hundreds of years

passed during the evolutionary period of parliament and
procedural growth without any concerted attempts to completely
nullify the efforts of parliamentary bodies for the desired
ends of a minority.

Modern parliamentary obstructionism is

usually credited to Parnell and the Irish delegation in the
commons.

The type practiced by Parnell in the name of Irish

nationalism was a menace to the principle of majority
government.

During the formative years of the House of

Commons;*. certain incidents occurred that could be called
i

obstructionism, although the form was mild in most instances.
The quorum in the House of Commons as a device of obstruct

59
ionism has never been great enough to endanger the system
as was the case during Parnell's reign.

Conversely, in the

United States House of Representatives, the quorum became
a severe enough problem to threaten the very foundations
of the house.
Long before the first instances of deliberate, quorum
obstructionism occurred in the commons, a very prophetic
clerk saw a potential evil in its use.

John Hatsell was the

clerk and as such compiled one of the first complete sets
of precedents of the House of
time

Commons.

During Hatsell's

a great deal of business was conducted by the House of

Lords— which is no longer the case since much of their
former power has passed on to the House of Commons.

In any

event, Hatsell was concerned with the Speaker who returned
from the Lords to inform the commons of their activities and
not finding a quorum.

Hatsell concluded,

I should think he ought, at least, to report what has
passed in the House of Lords; for it might otherwise
happen that, for want of forty Members, the Speaker
might be prevented from taking the Chair that day,
and from communicating to the House a speech or message
from the King, of which, 'as a message to adjourn,
and several other matters,1 they ought to be immediately
informed; especially as it is always in the power of
any Member to prevent the proceeding in any other
business than the report of the message, by calling
upon the Speaker to count the House.
If such an occurrence took place, Hatsell fails to state,

ftP r

John Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings in the House of
Commons with Observations, (2nd ed.; London: H. Hughs., 1 7 ^ /
Vol. II), p. 75.
i-
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but there can be no doubt that his mind perceived the
potential for obstructionism of sorts.
It wasn't until 1729, eighty-nine years after the
establishing of the original quorum rule that a speaker
announced the house was adjourned for want of forty members.
After the initial eighty-nine years had passed, failures of
the house to make were not so far apart, happening almost
yearly through the 18th century.

In the house, the actual

method of counting is as follows.

After the House has been

made, if notice be taken that forty members are not present,
the Speaker directs strangers to withdraw; and members are
summoned.

After the expiration of two minutes, the Speaker

proceeds to count the house, the outer door being kept open
during the proceeding to enable members approaching from
the lobby to be included in the count.

If it,be after

four o'clock (on Friday, one o'clock) that the absence of
a quorum is proved, the Speaker at once adjourns the house
until the next setting day.®3

There are further rules that

have been developed in regards to the quorum but in essence
the above is the general procedure.
The Speaker does not count the house but rather assumes
a quorum to be present unless his attention is drawn to the

®^sir Thomas Erskine May, Treatise on the Law, Privileges,
Proceedings, and Usages of Parliament, (16th ed.; London:
Butterworth & Co., 1957), p. 331«
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absence of a quorum.

Any member is entitled to draw attention

to the absence of a quorum at any time during a sitting simply
by so directing the Speaker to count.

Failure to make a

quorum is termed in the English Commons as "count out."
Franqueville, A French critic of the British House
states, "some members sometimes take malicious pleasure in
demanding a count out in order to end discussion which
embarrasses them or to delay the vote on a measure they
oppose

Franquerville, noted the lighter and sometimes

petulant side of the house when he reports,
They have lots of fun sometimes, particularly at the
dinner hour when the benches are empty and the orators
speak in a. desert or rather for the journalists and the
voters.
Sometimes they ask for several successive
counts and succeed in obtaining the desired result
to the great discontent of some deputies. When this
occurs the whips are blamed, one of whose principle
„
functions consists in making and maintaining a c h a m b e r .
On June 8, l871> Sir John Packington was the victim of a
count out.

He complained that at the moment he was about to

take the floor a member asked for the count out and caused
the end of the session.

He saw one of the ministers pass

to one: of his colleagues a note on which was written, "We
Q/T
: have come to count Packing on out; he is the first to speak."00
So entirely does the Speaker depend upon the house for
power to exercise his authority, that even if the number of
\

^Franqueville, Gouvernment et Le Parlement Britanniques,
Ed., Ji Rothschild, (Paris:.. 1887)7 Vol. Ill, p. 6 7 .
85Ibld.
86Ibld.
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members present drops below the required quorum, he cannot
take notice of the facts.

However, if only two members were

before the Speaker he could not take notice of the fact, nor
could he stop the business of the house.

Thus, if one member

proposed a resolution and another seconded it,- the Speaker
would have to put the question to a house composed of those
two members.

Further, such an action would appear in the

House Journal as if it had been agreed to by the whole body
of almost 7 0 0 1
Since the speaker has no power to notice that the
number in the house has fallen below the quorum, it must
be brought to his attention by a member.

Once some mention

has been made then all business stops at the Speaker’s cry
of "Order, Order," and two minutes are sallowed for the
formation of the quorum and if not made debate stops and
0(7

the house is closed for the evening.

'

It takes only the

slightest hint of no quorum to set the speaker in motion
as indicated by the following example:
■About a score of our representatives were giving
serious attention to a very serious address, on a 1
very important subject, by a very serious brother
member...Vexed by the scanty attendance that
listened to his all-important subject, he joked about
the crowded benches, the packed House, that he pretended
to see around. The jest was fatal; he had referred
to the number present; this done, the Speaker must
determine what that number is.
Order1 Orderi" from
the chair, silenced the debater.. Amazed he sat.down,

^ R e g i n a l d Palgrave, The House of Commons, (London:
MacMillan and Co., 1 8 6 9 ), p. 7b.
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quite ignorant of the effect of his wit,— then the
Speaker rose in all solemnity;'in due custom he began
the regular "one, two, three,
as his extended arm
pointed in stately circuit to each member. Soon all
was over; the two minutes elapsed; but twenty heads
were counted, and the House broke up, much in laughter
at the luckless orator, who had counted himself out.88
Another unusual quorum incident that could be considered
obstructionism occurred at the conclusion of Arthur Onslow’s
career as Speaker of the House; an incident that asserts
the power of procedure over the throne,
It was January 1761, and the King was in the House of
Lords, waiting to give his assent to the Money Bill.
The King waited and the Lords waited; they could do
nothing else until the Speaker appeared at the Bar.
And still they waited; and still there was no Speaker.
There were questions, agitations, whisperings, titters,
growlings; what had become of old Arthur? But old
Arthur was behaving, as usual, with exemplary correct
ness. He could not leave the House of Commons; indeed
he could not regard the House and the Speaker as being
officially in existence at all. Fewer than forty
members were present, and Arthur could not, would not,
budge until he had the necessary q u o r u m . ?9
In what must have been a crude attempt at obstruction, a
complaint was made on June 10, 1 8 7 ^ that members had been
obstructed on their return to the House during a count.
The speaker said it was the duty of the sergeant to keep
free access to the House, and he believed that duty had been
properly discharged.9°

88Ibld.. p. 79.
89c. E. Vulliamy, The Onslow Family, (London: Chapman
& Hall, 1953), p. 128.
9°May, op. cit., p. 332.
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Free access to the parliament seems to have been a
problem in earliest times.

Even the Tenendi directs a

door keeper to be present and make sure "entrance be denied
to none who ought to be present at the parliament."9 1
Even more significant is the rule in the Modus that without
his commons, the King could do nothing and the Modus directs
the commons after they are summoned not to come if, "the
Lord the King does not govern them as he ought . " ^ 2

Just

how, or if the commons ever utilized this quorum rule to
force action from the king is not known.
Although the number present might fall below the quorum,
the validity of the votes or resolutions passed before the
quorum count is demanded, cannot be challenged.

Cushing

reports that it has been said to be the practice, in the
House of Commons, for the government or administration, to
take measures to prevent the formation of a house on
particular occasions, with the purpose in mind of putting
off or suppressing discussion, which they wish to get rid
of, without putting it down to a direct vote.

The business

assigned beforehand for the day, on which the sitting is
thus prevented or terminated, falls to the ground, and must
be renewed on some other day; since each day is usually
appropriated in advance, for a considerable period, it is

^ ^ h o m a s D. Hardy (ed.), Modus Tenendi Parliamentum,
(London: Eyre and Spottiswode), P. 24^

92 Ibid., p. 42.
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difficult, if not
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impossible.

93

Cushing neglects to cite

specific examples of the above manipulation but such activities
seem quite probable in a

house whose ministers have been known

at times to be less than scrupulous.
In the national government and particularly the United
States House of Representatives, the full impact of a quorum
struggle has been realized.

As far back in history as 1788,

the author of the 5 8 th Federalist paper while advocating a
new Federal structure for the new nation of America, was
1

also quick to note procedural problems that might interfere
in a strong government.It is not known if it
or Madison who warned that, although

was Hamilton

there are some advantages

to a majority or more than a majority quorum, they are out
weighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale.

In the

author's words,
...it would facilitate and foster the baneful practice
of secessions; a practice which has shown itself even
in States where a majority only is required; a prac
tice subversive of all the principles of order and reg
ular government; a practice which leads more directly
to public convulsions and the ruin of popular govern
ments than.any other which has yet been displayed
among us.9^
As sincere and ominous as those words are, there have
been no instances of secessions in the early Congresses of
the national government— if by secessions it was meant
1

93Luther Cushing, Elements of the Law and Practice of
Legislative Assemblies, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
ltio6 ), p. 1 5 1 .
..
.
^Hamilton, op. cit., p. 301.
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that certain states

or delegation to the Congress would

depart the sessions

so as to have attendance

fall below the'

quorum requirement and thus obstruct business.

This is not

to say however, that the quorum requirement as adopted has
not been used to stifle,

business:

it is simply that a

different method of quorum obstructionism was developed,
a method not foreseen by the framers of the constitution.
The first hint of quorum trouble in the Federal Congress
>
•
did not occur until Jackson's administration, when members
of the House seem to have caused a quorum to fail, by ded i n i n g to

v o t e . 95

although the record

This event was on May 9, 1834* and
is somewhat vague on the

matter, it may

have set the precedent, for on May 30* 1 8 3 6 the refusal of
Members to vote moved John Bell of Tenessee to say, "the
time might and probably would come, when the order of the
House would be broken up by a factious
made it clear that he

minority."-^

He then

favored prompt punishment of members

who refused to vote.
<v.

Aside from these incidents, nothing occurred to suggest
a quorum problem in the national government until 1840.

In

that year no less a person than John Quincy Adams stifled
house business and in so doing set the precedent for a new

S. Congress, House, Roster of Debates, 23rd Cong.,
First Session, 1834-, p. 4023.

9^Ibid., 24th Cong. First Session, 1836, p. 4086-4099*
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form of quorum obstructionism.
The event started out innocuously enough.

The state of

New Jersey had a contested election case and the elected
members to the house were considered by Adams to be false
claimants. On March 6 * they were to be sworn in without
f
waiting for additional evidence that Adams maintained would
,

have a bearing on the matter.

The following comes from the

Diary of John Adams and gives an interesting account of the
matter.
. I had resolved* if thus called* not to answer to my
name. Many other members had determined to do the
same 3 and if all the minority would do so* the majority
could not form a quorum of the House* and therefore could
not perpetrate this outrage upon all justice and all
law...I resolved* however* at all events to practice
it myself* and await the consequences.97
Adams found the device to be one that produced results and
although there was "some flinching on the Administration
side*" he continued to use it.

On March 2^* Adams recounts,

The count was again taken by tellers* and was 10 ayes*
noes— all the opposition members forebearing to vote*
and thus leaving the majority without a quorum. The
committee were thus compelled to rise and report this
fact to the House; and this first disclosed to both
parties of the House; the secret of the defensive
strength of the. minority— a strength the more impreg
nable as it consists in silence and precludes all
disorder. The rage of the majority at this discovery
was unbounded; but it was impotent.^
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The opposition attempted to stifle the ability of the

97john Quincy Adams* The Diary of 179^-1845» Allan
Nevins* ed.* (New York;
Longmans* Green & Co.* 1 9 2 8 ), p. 505*

98Ibid., p. 506
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minority to remain silent and on March 25, it was moved by
Representative Taylor, "moved that I should be compelled
to vote.

Not in order.

upon me for not voting.

Beatty moved a resolution to censure
Not in order.

Motions to suspend

the call, and to adjourn, were multiplied, and failed,

e t c . " 99

Adams had struck upon the easiest method of obstruc
tionism.; the silent— or disappearing— quorum.

It was a

practice by which the minority part could prevent any
legislation or business they disliked by refusing a quorum.
A quorum was presumed to be present unless questioned, but
the rules permitted a roll call upon demand of a fifth of
the membership.

Minority members would demand the roll and

then remain silent when their names were called.

Since the

rules prescribed that a member's presence was established
only by a viva-voce reply to the roll, and since it required
a majority of the whole to constitue a quorum, the silent
filibuster could effectively stop the House from doing
business.

For nonpartisan matters the quorum would reappear,
fl.

only to vanish again as soon as a vote was asked on ahy
pending bill opposed by the minority.

The process could

be repeated interminably until the majority dropped the

bin.100
99ibid.
100Barbara Tuchman, "Czar of the House", American Heritage,
XIV, (December, 1 9 6 2 ), p..33.
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The device worked well for Adams but perhaps even he
realized its potential disruption in the house for he
refrained from further quorum obstruction during his term.
The device lay dormant for several years before it was again
utilized to any great extent.

This may or may not be due

to a respect of legislative procedure but simply because the
conditions were not right for its use.

Optimum effective

ness of the silent quorum requires a close division of the
house.

If this is not the case, the majority party can form

its own group to comply with the quorum requirement and in
so doing, void the minority obstruction.
Even before A d a m ’s disruption of the house; there had
been instances of quorum problems in the state governments.
In their haste to ratify the constitution, the federalists
in Pennsylvania had called
The

for the question on adoption.

antifederalist pointed out the motion was out of order

since Congress had not yet sent them the new constitution
and therefore it had not been given the required three
readings.

The nineteen antifederalists held an indignation

meeting and decided they would foil the proceedings by
staying away.
It took 47 to make a quorum, and without these malcontents
the assembly numbered but 45. When the house was called
to order after dinner, it was found there were but 45
members present. The sergeant-at-arms was sent to
summon the delinquints, but they defied him, and so it
became necessary to adjourn till next morning. It was
now the turn of the Federalists to uncork the vials of
wrath. The affair was disucssed in the taverns till
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after midnight, the 1 9 were abused without stint,
and soon after breakfast, next morning, two of them
were visited by a crowd of men, who broke into their
lodgings and dragged them off to the state,house, where
they were forcibly held down in their seats, growling
and muttering curses.
This made a quorum... a
Many states have had some unique experiences with quorum
obstructionism, but perhaps none have suffered as much as
Tennessee.

As late as 1911» thirty-four members of the house,

enough to break a quorum, fled to Alabama, because of contemi

plated changes in temperance and election laws.

Apparently

a fine time was had by all as they ventured on to Georgia.
The minority stayed on, met from day to day and worked out
a compromise suitable to the absentees, who finally returned
after two months absence.
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However, there can be no doubt that so far as volume
and severity of obstruction, the national House of Represent
atives was hardest hit, yet most reluctant to correct the
problem.

While the house was suffering from the problem

of the silent quorum, many state houses had eliminated it.
In fact when Speaker Seed broke the quorum in 1891» he
utilized the rationale set forth by Lieutenant Governor and
presiding:: officer David G. Hill of New York, who eliminated
the silent quorum there.

Hill, in 1883, maintained that

the constitutional provision as to a quorum was entirely

101

John Fiske, The Critical Period of American History.

(Boston* Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1888), p. 373*
102
Luce, op. clt.. p. 35.
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satisfied by the presence of the members, even if they did not
vote,! and accordingly he directed the recording officer of the
senate to put down the names of the members of the senate
who were present and refused to vote.
In his ruling on the matter, Hill stated:
...Today there are present over three-fifths of all
' the senators elected. They sit in their seats before
" me. Rule 14 of the senate requires each senator to
vote when his name is called, but a number— more than
enought to constitute the requisite three-fifths— refuse
to vote at all, either for or against the bill, and
remain silent. It is claimed that, therefore, they
are to be deemed absent and cannot be counted as
constituting a quorum. They are not absentees within
the meaning of the rules, because they are in fact
present. There can be no 'call of the house' or
other proceedings instituted to compel their attendance,
because they are not absent. Their action is in defiance
of the rules of this body, factious, and revolutionary.
If, because they refuse to respond to their names
when called, they are thereby to be deemed absent, of
what use are the rules of this body and the law which
gives this body authority to send its sergeant-at-arms
for its absent members and forcibly bring them into
this chamber, if, when brought in, they can still refuse
to vote and still be deemed absent? It would show that
all such provisions in the rules and in the statutes
were entirely nugatory and of no force or effect. There
is no principle of parliamentary law which permits a
senator to be present in his seat and refuse to respond
to his name, and then be allowed to insist that he is
not present.
If he does not want to be regarded as
present he must remain away from the chamber. This
is common sense, and it is not antagonistic to .
parliamentary law.l°3
A similar decision was made in Tennessee in 1 8 8 5 .
In the legislature, the house had ninety-nine members, of which
1

two-thirds was sixty-six.

A registration bill was pending

103u.
Congress, House, Hinds Precedents, 59th Cong.,
2nd Session., 1906, Vol. 4, p. 6 9 .
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which was objected to by the Republican members of the House.
Upon the third reading the Republicans refused to vote,
whereupon the speaker directed the clerk to count as present
those present but not voting, and a quorum being present,
declared the bill passed upon this reading.10^
The reluctance of members to answer their quorum calls
has not been restricted to the United States.

In the French

chamber of Deputies, where a majority is a quorum, it was
decided in 1 8 7 8 , by the President of the Country, that the
presence only, and not the participation in the voting of
a majority of: the members, is necessary for the validity of
a vote.'10-*
Never-the-less, the House of Representatives failed to
follow the quorum breaking of the states until 1 8 9 1 .

The

scattered attempts to do so before the fifty-first Congress
were over-ruled and real pressure for change did not start
building until 1875•

In that year a bill was called up and

there arose dilatory proceedings including the quorum call
and then refusal to vote.

Mr. Benjamin F. Butlar, of

Massachusetts, made the point that there was a quorum present,
and if the Chair would take note of the presence of Mr. Samuel
J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, who was participating in the
proceedings, but had not voted, and of the Chair himself,

1 0 ^Ibid.,

p. 6 7 .
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,there would be a quorum present.

John Coburn, representative

of Indiana, added that if a man is present but not voting,
one of his colleagues could vote for him.

The strong reply

was made by James G. Blaine, the Speaker:
•
The Chair never heard of that being done. He be^s
to remind the House, whereas that might and doubtless
would be true, that there is a quorum in the Hall, the
very principle enunicated by the gentleman from Indiana
has been the foundation probably for the greatest
legislative frauds ever committed.
Where a quorum,
I in the judgment of the Chair, has been declared to be
.!; present in the House against the result of a roll call,
these proceedings in the different legislatures have
' brought scandal on their names. There can be no record
’7
like the call of the yeas and nays; and from that there
is no appeal. The moment you clothe your Speaker with
power to go behind your roll call and assume that there
is is a quorum in the Hall, why gentlemen, you stand
on the very brink ’of a volcano.
Subsequent speakers were also reluctant to get near
the brink of the volcano, for attempts during the next few
years to end the silent quorum were futile.

Perhaps the

most ambitious attempt was made by John Randolph Tucker of
Virginia in 1880.

Tucker simply requested that the following

amendment to the rules be adopted:
Whenever a quorum fails to vote on any question,
and objection is made for that cause, there shall be
a call of the House, and the yeas and nays on the pend
ing question shall at the same time be ordered. The
Clerk shall call the roll, and each member as he answers
to his name, or is brought before the House under the
proceedings of the call of the House, shall vote on the
pending question.
Of those voting on the question and
decline to vote shall together make a majority of the
1

U. S. Congressional Record, 43rd Cong., 2nd Sess.,
Vol. 3, p. 1
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House, the Speaker shall declare that a quorum is con
stituted; and the pending question shall be decided as
the majority of those voting shall a p p e a r . 1 0 ?
Tucker was quick to offer explanation for this change in the
rules but the opposition was just as quick to condemn.
Tucker made the comparison between the House and the English
Commons where in the latter a quorum can be ascertained by
"ocular demonstration" but that such not the case in the
American House.

He continued by pointing out that the,

"Constitution does not say that a majority voting shall
constitute a quorum, but that a majority of the House shall
constitute a quorum to do business."

He concluded by

saying,
...it seems-to me not to be in accordance with the
progress of the age we live in that we should sit
there in a condition of nonaction under the selfdelusion we are not present when we are present, and
that there shall be a power on the part of gentlemen
here upon any question of remaining silentand saying,
'you cannotnnrove I am here unless I choose to open
my mouth.
Several members of the house spoke against the adoption .
of the rule.

Mr. Garfield was against giving one person the

power of declaring the presence of other members and charged
it would enable the speaker to,
...bring from his sick-bed a dying man and put him in ■
this Hall, so that the Speaker shall count him, and
make his presence against his will, and perhaps in his
delirium, count in order to make a quorum, so that
some partisan measure may be carried out over the

10?U. S. Congressional Record,
Vol. X, p. '57$1*

lO^Ibid.

46th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
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body of that dying man.

109

Mr. Blackburn, while not quite so emotional,simply asked
who would control the Speaker's seeing, and "how do we know
but that he may see forty members more for his purposes than
there are here in the House'*?-1--1-^

A touch of irony was to

come out of this verbal skirmish as Thomas B. Reed, in his
logical way, added his condemnation to Tucker's rule.

Several

days later, Tucker withdrew? his amendment after Mr. Blackburn,
head of the rules committee, let it beknown that his committee
would bury the rule.
During the next three Congresses, there occurred only
isolated instances of quorum obstruction and it proved to
be more of a nuisance than a tool to pervert majority rule
to impotency.

The 50th Congress, however, was vicitimized

by its own rules and its legislative output was meager and
passage of the usual routine measures was secured only with
the greatest difficulty.

The quorum filibusters tended to

make the body appear both odious and ridiculous in the eyes
of the country.

By the second session, the Speaker's

situation was pitiable and Congress had demonstrated that the
defects of the existing procedure were too deep-seated for any
group of leaders to exercise adequate guidance and control

1Q9lbld.. p. 576.
110Ibid.
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over the course of business.

For Instance, James B. Weaver

of Iowa, and a handful of sympathizers, held the House at
bay for eight days by using the quorum or any other rollcall device that would waste the day.1^

For all practical

purposes the house had ceased to function as a legislative
I. body. :j Only those bits of business that commanded an almost
unanimous consent were ever passed.
During the summer and autumn preceeding the Fifty-first
Congress, comments, articles and interviews with House
members pointed the way for an up-coming battle in the House.
Thomas B. Heed, the.Speaker elect, served notice that he
was going to attempt to change the rules, or as he stated:
I ought not to have written the words 'to change the
rules,' for that conveys an entirely incorrect idea.
No rules have to be changed, for the new House will
have no rules. What should have been written is that
there will be an effort to establish rules which will
facilitate the public business— rules unlike those of
the present House, which only delay and frustrate
action.
Roger Q. Mills, on the Democratic side, charged the Rep
ublicans were bent on mischief and that,*

«

they have some desperate enterprise on foot that their
prophetic souls tell them Is beyond the boundary of
rightful jurisdiction, and that in carrying it out
they will meet with stubborn opposition.11^
The Democrats held the trump card in the silent quorum.
li:LIbid.
n?
Thomas B. Reed, "Obstruction in the National House",
The North American Review, CXLIL (Oct., 1889), p. 427-^28.
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(New York:
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The Republicans were a majority by eight, only three more
than "a quorum, which was set at 1 6 5 .

To make a quorum, the

Republicans would be allowed only three absences, which
would be impossible with sicknesses and unavoidable absence
of members.
The session formally opened on December 2, 1 8 8 9 * and
the rules of the preceding Congress were referred to the
Committee on rules for consideration and report.

Speaker

Reed utilized general parliamentary law while awaiting their
report and the House moved slowly with routine matters.
Finally in the latter part of January, the House started
deliberations on four contested Republican seats.

On

January 2 9 , the West Virginia election case of Smith vs.
Jackson was called up.

The roll call gave yeas 162, nays 3,

not voting 1 6 3 , and on recapitulation, two Democrats with
drew their votes, making the result yeas l6 l, hays 2 , not
voting 1 6 5 *

The Congressional Record tells the story of

what happened next:
Mr. Crisp. No Quorum
The Speaker, The Chair directs the Clerk to record
the names of members present and refusing to vote:
(Applause on the Republican side)
Mr. Crisp. I appeal— (applause on the Democratic side)
— I appeal from the decision of the Chair.
The Speaker. Mr. Blanchard. Mr. Bland. Mr. Blout.
Mr. Breckinridge, of Arkansas Mr. Breckinridge of Kentucky.
Mr. Breckinridge of Kentucky. I deny the power of the
speaker and denounce it as revolutionary.
(Applause' on
the Democratic side of the House, which was renewed
several times.)
Mr. Bland. Mr. Speaker— (Applause on the Democratic
side.)
The Speaker. The House will be in order.
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Mr. Bland. Mr. Speaker, I am responsible to my
constituents for the way in which I vote and not to the
Speaker of this House (Applause.)
Mr. Speaker. Mr. Brookshire, Mr. Bullock, Mr. Bynum,
Mr. Carlisle, Mr. Chipman, Mr. Clements, Mr. Clunie,
Mr. Compton.
Mr. Compton. I protest against the conduct of the Chair
in calling my name.
The Speaker (Proceeding). Mr. Covert, Mr. Crisp, Mr.
Culverson of Texas (hisses on the Democratic side),
Mr. Cummings, Mr. Edmunds, Mr. Enloe, Mr. Pithian,
Mr. Goodnight, Mr. Hare, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Hayes.
Mr. Hayes. I appeal from any decision so far as I am
concerned.
The Speaker (continuing). Mr. Holman, Mr. Lawler,
Mr. Lee, Mr. McAdoo, Mr. McCreary.
Mr. McCreary.
I deny your right, Mr. Speaker, to count
me as present, and I desire to read from the parliamentary
law on that subject.
The Speaker. The Chair is making a statement of the
fact that the gentlemen from Kentucky is present.
Does
he deny it?
(Laughter and applause on the Republican
side.)
The tumult continued with such remarks as:
Mr. Morgan. I beg leave to protest against this as
unconstitutional and revolutionary...........
Mr. Outhwaite ('Cries of Regular Order.') I wish to
state to the Chair that I was not present in the House
when my name was called, and the Chair is therefore
stating that is not ture.
(Applause and cries of 'Orderi')
It is not for the Chair to say whether I shall vote or
not or whether I should answer to my name when it is
called.
(Laughter and applause.)'
*
Mr. Crisp.

I appeal from the decision—

Mr. Breckinridge, of Kentucky. It is disorderly; the
House has ordered a vote and the Speaker has no more
right to state that fact from the Speaker's chair than
he would have from the floor of the House. It is a •
disorderly proceeding on the part of the Speaker.
(Applause on the Democratic side.)-1-1^

1 % . s.. Congressional Records, 51st Cong., 1st Sess*,
Vol. 21/ p. 9 % .
■ii
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Speaker Reed continued his count, paying little attention
to the general pandemonium created by the members of the
House.

As he concluded the count and the confusion subsided,

Reed offered his ruling and the reasons for it.

He started

by recalling John Randolph Tucker's efforts to eliminate
the silent quorum, ten years earlier, mentioning also the
problems with the quorum in Tennessee and reviewing the
reasoning of David B. Hill in New York.

His arguments were

common-sense and not as elaborate as his subsequent published
arguments.

In essence, he maintained that the House had the

constitutional power to compel attendance of members by the
sergeant-at-arms and that such power was of no value if members
;were present and yet refused to be counted as a quorum.
Reed said, "Inasmuch as the Constitution provides for their
attendance only, that attendance is enough.

If more was

needed the Constitution would have provided for more."**^
Tumult even worse than before followed.

Breckinridge of

Kentucky demanded a point of order and was overruled.
*
then appealed the decision of the Chair, but an alert
Republican moved to take the appeal.

He

Such a motion would,

if carried, shut off debate; thus, the Democrates "foamed
with rage" and the House saw behavior that has yet to be
matched— including one Democrat who, unable to reach the
front because of the crowded aisles, came down from the

^•^Hinds Precedents, ;
.cp. cit., p. 6 7 .

8o
rear, leaping from desk to desk.

Another member from Texas

sat significantly whetting the bowie knife on his boot.
Tension broke briefly when Representative Spinola of New
York, pointing to a picture of the siege of Yorktown on the
wall, accused the Speaker of counting the Hessians in the
-j

background to make up his quorum.

t

ZT

At each call ofthe

roll, Reed counted heads and repeated his formula, "A
Constitutional quorum is present to do business," while all
the time keeping control of himself, or as the New York
Times said, "cool and determined as a highwayman."
Before the issue was settled, the House witnessed some
great debate.

Carlisle, Turner, Crisp for the Democrats

and McKinley, Cannon, Butterworth and Reed for the Republicans.
One of the ablest speeches of the debate was made by Butterworth.

He argued that a representative was chosen to serve

not merely his own constituency but the whole country, and
f

that he had no warrent to attempt to paralyze the action of
the House, but that the country had a right to require that
he should be in his place and perform his duties.

The consti

tution had specifically given the House the power to compel
attendance of its members.

What was the object of this power?

Was this authority conferred by the Constitution
only to enable us to go through the farce of bringing
in the absentees and learning after each member has
been seated in his place that, while under the
Constitution he is actually personally present to make

ll6ruchman, op. cit.j p. 95*

8l
a quorum to do business, yet when an attempt is made
to do the thing which required his presence, he at
once by merely closing his mouth becomes constructively
absent? Or he may, in fact, while present, arise in
his place and assert that he is absent, : and we must take
his word for it. What an absurdity on the face of it,
no matter how sactified by agel It is the weapon of
the revolutionist. It is the weapon of a n a r c h y . 1 ^
The Democrats attempted to absent themselves from the
House altogether but Reed was able to gather a quorum from
the ranks of the Republicans although it meant two members
brought in on their sickbeds.

This occurred on the fifth

day and after the quorum was made the Democrats filed back
to their seats and the silent quorum was defeated.

A few

weeks later the Rules Committee reported out a new set of
rules, composed by the Chairman— who was also Speaker of
the House.

Known thereafter as "Reeds Rules" and adopted

on February 14, they provided among other things that (1)
all members must vote; (2) one hundred shall constitute a
quorum for a committee of the whole; (3) all present shall,
be counted; and (4) no dilatory motion shall be entertained
and the definition of what is dilatory is*to be left to the
judgment of the Speaker.

lift

The death cf the silent quorum reflected a profound
alteration in the parliamentary procedure of the House.
However, it was not long before the Democrats attempted to
I
■^■^Samuel W. McCall, American Statesmen, Vol. 35:
Thomas B. Reed, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914). p. 170.
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nullify the quorum ruling and restore the weapon of the
silent quorum.

In 1 8 9 2 , the Democrats won control of the

House by a large enough majority to gather a quorum without
being dependent on the Republicans, whereupon they threw
out Reed's reform.

In the following Congress the Democrats

were split on several basic issues and with reduced ranks,
were unable always to procure a quorum.

Reed was retired

from the Speakership but was still in a position of strength
as the leader of the Republicans on the floor.

From this

position Reed organized a filibuster and continually requested
roll calls that held up the transaction of business on one
occasion for two weeks.

Finally the Democrats adopted a rule

providing that a member who was present might be counted for
the purpose of making a quorum, whether he voted or not.
Reed must have enjoyed a sweet revenge but refrained from
crowing and instead simply said, "This scene here today is
a more effective address than any I could make, I congratulate
the Fifty-Third Congress".1-5-9
The quorum rules that Reed initiated and adopted by the
Democrats were sustained in a decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States.

The case of U.S. v Ballin arose out

of the act providing for the classification of worsteds,
passed by the House on May 9* 1 8 9 0 .

On the vote there

appeared yeas 1 3 8 , nays 0, not voting 189*

119Ibid., p. 130.
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then announced the names of 7 8 Members present and not
voting, along with those who were, showed a total of 2 1 2
Members present, constituting a quorum present to do business.
The validity of this act was questioned and was carried as
far as the Supreme: .Court.

The following paragraph gives the

substance of the court's decision:
As appears from the Journal at the time this bill
passed the House, there was present a majority, a quorum,
and the House was authorized to transact any and all
business.
It was in a condition to act on the bill if
it desired. The other branch of the question is whether,
a quorum being present, the bill received a sufficient
number of votes; and here the general rule of all parl
iamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is present, the
act of a majority of the quorum is the act of the body .^ 2 0
The effect of Reed's modification of the quorum and the
Supreme Court concurrence has rendered the quorum a limited
tool of obstruction.

It can however, be used to accomplish

other ends that amount to obstruction.

For instance during

the 1964 civil rights bill debate, the Southern members of
the Senate were staging a filibuster.

Each day, Senators

Humphrey, and Kuchel, the bill's floor managers, wrote letf,

ters to Northern Senators exhorting them to be on hand to
answer quorum calls.

The Southern strategy was to keep

demanding roll calls in order to prolong the filibuster.
If a quorum failed to answer the roll, the Southerners could
adjourn for the day and rest up for the next day's filibuster.
When the Northerners failed to raise a quorum on April 4,

•^^United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1.
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Senate. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, called this, "a
travesty on the legislative process,1
Modern American usage of the quorum.

1?1
Aside from quorum

obstructionism, another facet of the quorum that has been
C

troublesome to organizational bodies has been the question
of just what constitutes a quorum.

Chapter one cites several

definitions of the quorum that are offered in selected
parliamentary procedure textbooks.

All are very general and

are open to the types of questions that follow the definitions,
"Supra, p. 1 6 , 1 7 ".
Once again, the House of Representatives furnishes an
excellent opportunity for the development of procedure to
be traced in respect to this aspect of procedure.

The

constitution states that a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum.

In the absence of a set number, court

decisions have established the majority to be the legal
quorum number.

122

In the House the question emerged

under the Speakership of Galusha A. Grow, as to just what
precisely constitutes a quorum.

In l86l, Vallandigham of

Ohio, made a point of order that no House existed since the
Chair had counted a quorum on the basis of a majority of

^ %?he Humboldt Times, June 23, 1966, p. 4.
1 PP

Masson in his book on Legislative procedure has
indexed the cases in detail that substantiate the majority
as the quorum. See particularly Brown v Dist. of Columbia
(1888), 127, U.S. 579, 32L. Ed. 262. Masson, op. cit., p. 336.
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members chosen, not on the basis of those sworn in.

The

reasons for such a request probably stem from the fact that
at the beginning of the Civil War a large number of con
stituencies refused to elect, thus it was practically impossible
to secure the attendance of a majority of all possible members*
The speaker responded by quoting the constitution, "The
House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen
every second year by the people of the several States."
Vallandigham did not elect to argue the point and the house
acquiesced in the decision.•L23
There was no further discussion over the question of
what constituted a quorum of the house until 1 8 7 9 ,, when
Speaker Randall from Maine, concluded that although there
was a majority of the House present a true quorum could be
fewer, to account for the fact that there were two vacancies.
Whether Randall was correct to conclude two fewer for a quorum
because of the vacancies was not challenged, hence no decision.
The question was brought up again on May 10, 1886 when
*

Speaker Carlisle stated that'it was an open question "as
to whether or not it requires a majority of all members who
might be elected under the law to the House to constitute
a quorum or merely a majority of those who are Members of
the House."

i plx

The matter was left at this point until

123Hinds, op. cit., p. 6 0
12^Ibid.
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September, I8 9 0 .

Thomas B. Reed was Speaker.

Charles

Crisp of Georgia made the point that no quorum was present
since the quorum count had excluded four vacancies.

Reed

had to decide whether 164 members were a quorum or, counting
the four vacancies, 166 was the legal quorum.

In his decision,

which reviewed the previous decisions on the matter, Reed
concluded that the words, "those chosen" meant members chosen
then alive, thus 164 would be the proper number.
But Reed's decision still did not go far enough and in
1906

it was necessary to re-define what constituted a proper

quorum.

In the decision of that year, Speaker Cannon of

Illinois turned to a Senate Committee report which stated
a quorum was a majority duly chosen and sworn.

For the

purposes of the House, he added that a quorum consists of
a "majority of those members chosen, sworn, and living,
whose membership has not been terminated by resignation or
by the action of the House."
April 16, 1906,
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Speaker Cannon's ruling of

is still regarded as the correct inter1

pretation of the phrase in the constitution that states,
"a majority of each (House) shall constitute a quorum to do
business," and continues to be regarded as the definitive
ruling on this point.
Since Speaker Cannon's ruling, the question has rarely
i
j

125u . S., Congressional Record, 59th Cong. 1st Sess.,
1 9 0 6 , p. 5354.
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been the subject of floor discussion and frequent reaffermations^ of the ruling by the Chair have not been required.
However, on May 9, 1913* Speaker Clark, in response to a
point of order that 2 1 6 members did not constitute a quorum,
stated, "Two hundred and sixteen Members constitute a quorum.
Four hundred and thirty-four Members constitute the whole
membership of the House, but one is dead and three have never
been sworn in."12^

The matter has been left at this and

no new efforts at defining the quorum requirement of the
constitution have been attempted.
Many decisions and acts that have been passed by Legis
lative bodies, corporations, boards and private groups etc.,
have been challenged and tested in light of their procedural
legality.

As a result, rules from the House of Representatives

as well as other organizations, have had their legality
tested in the courts of law for over the past one hundred
years and there now exists a series of legal cases that
define and limit the quorum concept.
Words and Phrases,

The following, from
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' cover the general usage of the quorum

as evolved by the courts:
A majority always constitutes a 'quorum,' of a
deliberative body, in absence of some legal requirement
fixing different number, and can take any action within
power of body to transact. Herring v. City of Mexia,
Tex.,

126U. S., Congressional Record, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess.,
p. 1457.
127"Quorum," Words and Phrases, Vol. 35A.
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The general rule applicable to boards, commissions
and similar bodies or entities of a definite membership
applies to a building commission appointed to build
county buildings unless the statute otherwise specifi
cally provides, to-wit, that a 'quorum' consists of
a majority of its members, and that such 'quorum'
due notice having been given to the time and place
of meeting of all members, can exercise the powers
of the commission:
and further, that action of a
majority of such 'quorum' is the action of the body
or commission.
State ex rel. Green v. Edmondson,
23 Ohio Dec. 8 6 , 9 6 , 12 Ohio N.P., N.S., 5 7 7 , 588.
Under generally accepted Rules of Parliamentary
Procedure, in absence of contrary provision, a
majority of authorized membership of a body,
consisting of a definite number of members, constitutes
a 'quorum' for the purpose of transaction business.
McCormick v. Board
of Ed. of Hobbs Municipal School
Dist. No. 16,. 274 P2d 299, 308, 58 N.M. 648.
In actions to have office of county manager of
Florence county declared vacant, to restrain hold
over officer from continuing to exercise duties thereof,
and to compel him to turn over office to alleged new
appointee, where there was a consistent tie on every’
ballot of governing board of Florence county seeking
to elect county manager and three members withdrew
from meeting after 5 o'clock and remaining three '
members unanimously voted for county manager, evidence
sustained finding that at the time of attempted
election there was
no 'quorum', essential to valid
election.
Gaskins
v. Jones, 18 S.E. 2d 454, 456, 457,
1 9 8 , s.c. 5 0 8 .
Where by-laws of corporation required that four
be a quorum at directors meeting, but, at meetings where
bonuses were voted to majority stockholder who was
dominating director, only four directors including
the dominating director were present, there was no
'quorum', meetings were illegal, and bonuses were
mere 'gratuities', especially where notice of such
meetings was not given.
In re Fergus Falls Woolen
Mills Co., D. C. Minn., 4l F. Supp. 355, 3 6 2 .
'Quorum'-* within corporate bylaw providing that
majority of directors shall constitute quorum meant
majority of remaining directors, not majority of total
authorized number of directors, and two of remaining
three directors could elect individual to fill vacancy
where third remaining director and refused to attend
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election meeting and other bylaws provided for vote
of majority of 'whole board' and three-fourths of
'whole board 1 where serious action was involved.
Gearing v. Kelly, 222 N. Y. S. 2d 474, 476, 15
A.D. 2d 219.
Under const, art 6 , SS 5* 8 , Rev. St. 1 9 0 8 , SS1412,
a majority of the members of the Supreme Court constitute
the court en banc, and a majority of the court as thus
constituted may decide a case, three judges at least
concurring; a 'quorum,' as used in the statute, meaning
a majority of the entire body. Mountain States Telephone
& Telegraph Co. v. People 190 P. 5 1 3 , 517, 6 8 , Colo. 487.
As used in Const, art. 6SS2, par. 1, providing
that the Court of Errors and Appeals shall consist
of the chancellor, the justices of the supreme court,
and six judges, or a major part of them, the words
'a major part of them' do not refer merely to the
six judges, but refer back to all of the antecedents
and mean that a majority of the entire court, including
the chancellor, the justices, and the six judges, shall
constitute a 'quorum' being sufficient to render a
decision. In re Hudson County, 144 A. 1 6 9 , 171, 106
N.J. Law, 62.
A 'quorum' of grand jury means that at least 12
grand jurors were present. People v. Dale, 179 P.
2 d 8 7 0 , 8 7 2 , 79 CA 2 d 3 7 0 .
It is now well settled that in all cases the
majority of a legislative body is a quorum entitled
to act for the whole body, unless the power that
creates it has otherwise directed.
Zeller v. Central
'R. Co . 3 5 A. 9 3 2 , 9 3 4 , 84 MD. 304, 34 LRA 4 6 9 .
Lastly, the method of computing a quorum should be
noted.

The following example by Sturgis is a method that

meets legal requirements and is in general use by private
organizations and in many cases, official and legislative
bodies.

In computing a quorum, only members in good

standing are counted.

The quorum of an organization with

a membership list of 2 6 2 members and a required quorum of
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one-sixth of its members would be computed as follows:
Total membership list ............. ...262
Delinquent members.............

12

Members in good standing.............. 250
Number required for quorum............ 42
Since a quorum always refers to the number of members
present and not to the number voting, in the example just
cited, if only 2 5 voted on a question, the vote would still
be legal provided there was present a quorum of 4-2 or more
members in good standing.

A member who is

disqualified

because of personal benefit or interest in a particular
question cannot be counted for the purpose of computing a
quorum for a vote on that question or of counting a majority
of the quorum.
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The presiding officer, if he is a

member of the organization, is counted in computing a
q u o r u m . ^30

■^^Enright v. Heckscher (1917) 240 Fed. 8 6 l, 153
C.C.A. 5497
1 2 9shugars

v. Hamilton (1906) 122 Dy. 6 0 6 , 92 S.W. 564

•^^Alice F. Sturgis, Standard Code of Parliamentary
Procedure, (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1 9 5 0 ) , P* 15•

II.

PHILOSOPHY OP THE QUORUM

Parliamentary procedure is a state of mind as much as
a system of maintaining order.

Take away the attitude and

desire for order and progress In conducting the business
of an organizational body and chaos will ensue.

Like all

of man's law, parliamentary procedure requires an affirmative
attitude for orderly group action to transpire.

Strip away

the affirmative attitude and only the mechanical rules
remain; these rules are Inadequate by 'themselves.
Wilkenson Gray has constructed a set of principles under
which true and effective parliamentary procedure must work.
The first principle and perhaps most Important is that the
group, as a whole, has the right to determine its own course
of action.

The device which is used to determine which

course of action a group may follow is often discussed,
namely' the use of boting or balloting, but these devices
rely on more basic, seldom considered principles.
This
*
basic and fundamental aspect of democratic boting and
decision making is the concept of a majority and minority;
or, the concept that the greater part of a voting body
determines the will of the whole.

In fact, the concept of

^•Wilkenson Gray, "Philosophy of Parliamentary Law",
Quarterly Journal of Speech. (October, 19^1)* p. ^37.
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a minority with rights that will acquiesce to the will of
the majority as if it had been their own, "is an invention
no less definite than that of the lever or wheel, and is
found for the first time as an every day method of decision
in Greek political life."2
The exact moment or place of the first instance of
majority rule will probably never be known but one obvious
answer is simply that the side with the greater strength
or number of swords would have its will prevail.

In any

event, majority rules emerged in ancient Greece as a standard
method of policy making.

Since then, in many and various

societies the majority rule concept has been maintained as
a method of decision making and in modern democracies is a
fundamental rule.
There are, of course, those political systems that
in both theory and practice repudiate the idea of majority
rule as well as minority existence.

For Instance, in theory

Thomas Hobbes-^ held that government, when instituted, was
neoessarily to have absolute power, and not necessary to
consider 'the rights of minority or even of a majority of
subjects, as opposed to the will of the man, or assembly of
'^
U
men, to* whom was given the sovereign authority.

2

Bernard Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the
State. (London: MacMillan and Oo., I925)t P» '4.
^Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. (London: Andrew Crooke,
1651), p. 115.
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In practice we need but look to modern day communism, I.e.,'
Red China to find an example where no discernible effort is
made to allow the majority to rule, or minority protection
to exist outside the power e l i t e . M o s t western governments
that are democratic in design are in part considered dem
ocratic because rule is by majority and those in power
attempt to protect the minority— often referred to as the
"loyal opposition".
Thus, in the development of parliamentary procedure the
concept of majority rule and minority acquiescence and
protection are basic.

A government or ruling body that

does not allow majority rule and minority protection cannot
be considered truly democratic in the usual sense of the
word.

Pirther, a government may be ruled by majority but unless

. t h e minority is protected, a realistic form of free government
cannot exist.

It is minority protection, or rights beyond

the reach of the majority which constitute liberty, not the
: power of the majority.-^
$
Under a democratic government that professes rule by

Hobbes neglects to explain Just how differences of
opinion between members of the assembly or sovereign and assembly
were to be resolved
^aPeter S. H. Tanz, Communist China Today, (New York*
Praegor, Inc., Pub., 1957)» P« 17&.
^Francis Lleber, Civil Liberty and Self-Government,
(Philadelphia* J.B. Lippincott & Co., 18$3), p. 31*

9b

the majority, two conditions concerning the minor!tymajority concept may develop which contain evils of such
magnitude as to possibly corrupt the system.

First, on

initial impression what appears to be rule by majority may
in fact be quite the opposite; in reality an organized
minority may impose its will on a disorganized majority.
The will of the people practically means the will of the
most numerous or the most active part of the people, the
majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted
as the majority.**

This same trend can easily occur outside

the framework of national governments as any public or
private organization can be ruled by a genuine majority or
suffer from a minority that dictates to the majority in the
name of majority rule.
i

In practical life, there exist classes

.

or blocs which do the ruling.

The management of public

affairs and private, organization business, or policy
direction is generally in the hands of a minority of in
fluential persons, to which the majority will defer:.'.
Concern for this very problem led the authors of the
Federalist Papers to warn the new nation of America to
be aware of a powerful minority since,
It is, that in all legislative assemblies the greater
the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the
men who will in fact direct their proceedings.
In the
first place, the more numerous an assembly may be, of
whatever characters composed, the greater is known to

**Bosanquet, op. cit.. p. 7 0 .
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be the ascendancy of passion over reason.
In the next
place, the larger the number, the greater will be the
prpportlon of members of limited information and of
weak capacities.'
Secondly, and of less Immediate consequence to parliamentary
procedure, is the condition known as the majority tyranny.
Many thinkers have considered the problem but it was Tocquevllle,
the early observer of America, who made sobering comments on
the emraanent tendencies toward majority despotism in America.
He prophesied that:
1'.

If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed,
that event may be attributed to the unlimited authority
: of the majority, which may at some future time urge the
| minorities to desperation, and oblige them to have
!Irecourse to physical force. Anarchy will then be the
„
[result, but it will have been brought about by despotism.

The America of 1830’s was the subject of Tocquevllle's concern
and now almost 1 5 0 years later, the tyranny of the majority
is still a potential threat.
Hamilton and Madison were aware of the latent dangers
'

r

of a large legislature and in the Federalist Papers warned
...the more multitudinous a representative assembly
may be rendered, the more it will partake of the
infirmities Incident to collective meetings of the
people.
Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning,
and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation.
The people can never err more than in supposing that
by multiplying their representative beyond a certain

^Alex. Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The
Federalist or the New Constitution, (London: J.M. Dent,
1911). P. 300.,
a
°Alexis de Tocquevllle, Democracy in America. Trans,
Henry Reeve, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.,
190*0, Vol. I., p. 287.

limit, they strengthen the barrier against the
government of a f e w . 9
Parliamentary procedure is constructed on the concept
of rule by the majority— howeverr imperfect this may be or
whatever be the built-in problems or propensity for abuse.
Within the framework of procedure the concept of the quorum
requirement has been devised.

There are several immediate

and easily discernible reasons for a quorum.
First it can be utilized to force a degree of attendance.
It is somewhat of a paradox that the history of freedom of
government and the establishment of democracy has been the
fight to insure the right of all persons to have a voice
in their government; yet, frequently legislative organizations
are hard put to devise methods of forcing their members to
attend and do the work required to maintain representative
government.

To represent one's community or organization

is considered a privilege but such has not always been the
case.

For instance in medieval England, where the concept

of representation was beginning to develop, Pollard noted
that,
The difficulty was to enforce the attendance of rep
resentatives, medieval "liberties" were nearly fatal to
representation and to the county courts, for the most
cherished liberty was that which excused the lords and
his tenants... 0

^Haml1ton, loc. cit.
10Pollard, op. cit.. p. 109.
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It has been noted elsewhere in this paper the
attendance problem that preceded the adoption of a quorum
requirement in the house of commons In 1640.

The quorum

requirement may have eased the problem of a thin house, but
far from solved it.

Forty is a small number when the total

of the house for over three hundred years has been over
five hundred members.
number easy to come by.
1678,

Yet not' always was this simple quorum
In the House it was enacted in

thirty-eight years after the quorum requirement, that, "

"...absentees should be fined 40L, and if they refused to
pay the fine, then to be committed to the tower."
1693

11

In

the speaker was direoted to write letters to the sheriffs

of respective counties, requesting they send back errant
members of the house.

The non-attendanoe of members in the

House is cause for concern but sometimes the reason is
comic, as when no House could be formed to discuss the rival
claims of the old and new East India Company— the members
had dispersed to see a tiger baited by dogs.1**

por the

House of Commons, the quorum number Is small and is
inadequate to offer but a minimum assist in developing a
House of at least fifty percent of the members.

Yet, attempts

to change the quorum were few and readily defeated.

11

A W. C. Townsend, History of the House of Commons from
1688 to 1832. (London* 1843, Vol. II), p. 3 6 6 .
1 2 Ibld.
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There are certain pragmatic considerations that should
I:'
be noted in regards to small attendance.
In the House of
Commons, the American Congress or any private or. government
group, optimum efficiency of procedure does not necessarily
occur with full attendance.

In fact, most organizations do

operate better with a small number in attendance.

But here

the problem of a minority control again becomes a concern;
hence, here must be in attendance enough of the membership
to Insure diversity of views and discussion.

Moreover, the

larger, a legislative body is made, the more difficult it
becomes for the members to combine successfully for purposes
recognized as improper.

Or as Sidgwich stated,

...the enlargement of the assembly beyond a certain
point tends to give undue advantage in debate to the
less valuable qualifications for oratory, and makes
its meetings more liable to lapse into confusion,
impulsiveness, and intemperance of a mob; and it
Involves the further drawback that the members have
greater difficulty in obtaining useful personal
knowledge of each other.
An even stronger argument can be found in the Federalist
Papers t
...In all cases where justice or the general good
might require new laws to be passed, or active measures
to be pursued, the fundamental principle of free
government would be reversed.
It would be no longer the
majority that would rule;
the power would be transferred
to the minority.1^

•'•^Henry Sidgwick, The Elements of Politics. (London*
MacMillan and Co., 1897), p. 4o6,
■^Hamilton, loc. cit.
'• i
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Secondly, the quorum can protect the majority or a
large number of a body from an unusually small number of
members who might attempt to proceed with business favorable
only to those present.

In theory, as Cushing points out,

the condition of fewer than the total membership doing
business is not really possible under the strictest adherence
to parliamentary practice,
...where authority is conferred upon several persons,
to be excercised with others all the persons authorized
must be present in order to excercise it, and that
authority delegated to the discretion of an individual,
cannot be delegated by him to another.
The strict adherence to this rule would be cumbersome if not
impossible; hence, exception Is made and only a specified
number or quorum need be present.

The question quickly

arises, as to Just what is a proper quorum number.

Some

organizations use a set number, some use a percentage,, Most
organizations, particularly governmental legislatures, have
a set number that is specified by the organization^ constitution.
How this number is computed or determined is considered in
another chapter.
■The selection of a quorum number can be quite a oapriclous thing with each organization attempting to meet
its particular needs.

It has been noted that the English

»■

^Cushing,

pp. pit., p. 9^.
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House of Commons requires forty to form a quorum; the United
States House of Representatives requires a majority of those
present and voting as do most state governments.

Over twenty

use the same words that the United States Constitutibnii does*
"a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do
business.”

Some state houses require two-thirds including

Illinois, Tennessee, Indiana, etc.

In New Hampshire seven

members of the senate make a quorum; in Massachusetts not less
than sixteen for the senate and not less than sixty for the
house.

In all, most states simply call for a majority and

private organizations that meet regularly in one geographic
area do the same.

For national organizations with large

memberships a small percentage is generally required.
But what is the logic that can allow twenty members of
a group, as in the English house, the power so speak in the
name of 670 members, or if a majority as in the United States
House, 119 members binding 435 as if all had assented to
the enactment?

Parliamentary procedure allows most motions

to pass with a majority of affirmative votes but with a
quorum of a majority, the majority of the majority may
legally proceed with business in the name of the entire
body.

Thus, with the quorum at a majority, 25 percent is

needed for the transaction of business.^ With the quorum

-*-^Cushing points out how even the small number of
forty has been stretched on occasion in the commons. The

1 01

number smaller, a corresponding smaller portion of the
membership constitutes a quorum.

Serious doubts can be

raised about a system that allows such a small number to
speak for the entire body, particularly in the name of majority
protection.

Another problem of quorum usage that may harm

the majority is a result of a quorum requirement that is too
high or when adequate attendance is a problem.

What might

occur is the power might shift from the majority to the
i
minority, since without minority attendance there can be no
business accomplished.

Hypothetioally, it is possible for

one single member to veto any bill if the quorum is formed
by only one more than the required quorum number, for without
his vote or attendance no quorum is present.

This amounts to

a potential club over the head of an organization and can be
used by the minority to dictate its will on the entire
)
group. Hardly does such a situation maintain accord with
fairness and majority will.

In his commentaries on the

constitution, Joseph Story considered the problem of the
majority Quorum and stated,
If such a course were generally allowed, it might be
extremely prejudicial to the public interests in cases,
with required new laws to be passed, or old ones
modified, to preserve the general, in contradistinction
to the local or special interests.
If it were even

Instance was a house divided, Mtwenty-seven ayes and eight nays,
the aggreate of which, with the two tellers on each side and the
ppeaker, just made up a quorum, the question was thereby held
deoided.'* Ibid.. p. 122.
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confined to particular cases, the privilege might
enable an interested minority to screen themselves
from equitable sacrifices to the general weal;, or in
particular cases, to extort undue indulgences. '
Whether the minority elects to make "equitable sacrifices”
or "extort undue indulgences" is a moot point as this
situation is wholly in violation of the principles of
procedure that maintains the majority will, shall prevail.
If the use of the quorum for purposes of forcing
attendance and protection of the majority are legitimate
uses of the quorum, there are other and less noble uses to
which the device may be put.

Champ Clark, after 25 years in

the House of Representatives, part of those as Speaker, observed
many of the diverse possibilities of the quorum:
...to defeat a bill which some member deems obnoxious,
...because some one is angered by the proponents of
a bill,;.*because some member who is not opposed to
the pending bill wants to kill time so that some other
bill to which he is opposed cannot be considered,
...because of a desire for revenge for the recent de
feat of his own pet measure,...because he desires to
annoy somebody else or to show his power,...because
he is weary or hungry or has an engagement or thinks
the House has sat long enough, and hopes by^raising the
point of no quorum to force an adjournment.
At best such uses of the quorum could only be considered
dilatory, but never-the-less under the right circumstances
such ends could be realized with the use of the quorum.

^^Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States, (5th ed.; New York: Little Brown & Co.,
1891), Sec. 35.

18

Champ Clark, My Quarter Century of American Politics.
(New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1920), Vol. I, p. 199.

-
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Champ Clark may have had tongue In cheek when he listed
. the above, but there can be no doubt as to the truth involved.
• All of which points to the question as to how far can the
quorum— or any parliamentary device— be perverted to gain
ends that are unrelated to initial pruposes?

In the case of

the quorum, the opportunities have been numerous.

/
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I SUMMARY

'I'
.
•
The purpose of this study was twofold* to discover a

history of the quorum and to discover a philosophy of the
quorum as It is used as a function or device of parliament
ary procedure.

Tne study was primarily aimed at events in

American political history but traced the origins and usages
of the quorum from its fragmentary beginnings in medieval
English parliaments to its development as a standard prac
tice of parliamentary law.
The study revealed that a form or concept of the quorum
was utilized as early as the 12th century during the germ
ination period of the English parliament.

The concept is

stated by the label "quorum" in 1 3 2 7 and linked with the
development of the office of the justice of the peace.

The

<5

quorum was adopted as a constant rule of procedure in I6*f0
by the English House of Commons.

Its function at that time

appears as^an effort to force attendance.
A quorum requirement was consistantly imposed by the
English monarch in the charters granted to the various Amer
ican colonies— of ten in an attempt to maintain a form of
political control.

The use of the Quorum device was wide-
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■ spread In state legislatures and by the time of the constitu
tional convention of 1887 it was an item of concern for the
. framers of the new constitution.

Despite certain objections

the quorum in both houses was set at a majority, paving the
way for the utilization of the quorum as a device of par; liamentary obstruction.
On occasion the quorum had been used as a device of
obstruction in the House of Commons but the optimum condi
tion for stifling parliamentary business was not realized
■until John Q. Adams refused to answer the quorum call in
. 183^ in the American House of Representatives.

Although

this practice had been used in legislative bodies before,
Adams brought it into respectability.

The practice became

known as the silent or disappearing quorum.

Once estab

lished the silent quorum was used in many state legislatures.
Its continued use to obstruct reached intolerable limits in
the 50th United States Congress.

Thomss B. Reed, the Speaker

of the 51st Congress, faced the issue and was successful in
breaking the silent quorum.

His parliamentary revision of

quorum usage was upheld by the Supreme Court.
Finally, the study discussed assumptions which must be
present to provide a realistic use of the quorum. Such
assumptions included a system of democratic voting and

I

decision making based on the concepts of majority rule and
minority acqulesence and protection.

The study of the phllos

ophy of the quorum revealed the intensity and extent to which
"'•! '’
'V.I-;s'
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men will struggle to attain a realistic form of group man
agement for deliberative bodies— of which the foremost goal
of the quorum has been to secure a more fair system of
democratic representation and action to insure the rights
of all persons.
II RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE QUORUM USAGES
One of the more pressing problems related to parliamen
tary procedure today is the inability of organizations to update
or reform their own methods of doing business.

As organizations,

and particularly legislative branches of government, travel their
evolutionary path, discarding old duties and responsibilities
while adding new ones, they tend to continue to utilize the
same procedure.

When viewed in terms of decades and centuries,

certain practices become quite antiquated and should be discarded.
It is important that organizations be aware of the need to
review the mechanics of their procedure and fit it to the
organization's real needs.

Such is particularly the case with

legislative branches of government where rules committees continue
to add but rarely subtract or synthesize their practices.

In

this age of advanced technology, when the magic of the computer
is becoming commonplace, organizations would do well to consider
how they might gain from the utilization of mechanical devices
to speed their procedure.
I:,
Tn specific respect to the quorum as a function 'of
y

.•

.. Jl” A:,-;
j} ; . •
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parliamentary procedure, the results of this investigation in ,
indicate that many organizations should review their quorum
requirement in light of the following recommendations for
future quorum usages.
First, organizations ^without a specific need should
eliminate the quorum requirement— subject to the implementation
of certain safeguards.

In this era of rapid communications

there should be no quorum requirement for the opening or
continuance of business.

The ease by which information can

be transmitted, received and recorded with electronic devices
allows sufficient communication between members of organizations
without each others physical presence.

However the following,

in whole or part, should be used when a specific quorum is not
required*
1.

Calendars set up

distributed to all members
2.
time

Printed agendas

for work periods,sessions,

etc. and

or units;
submitted to all members

at a set

before each scheduled meeting*
3.

A majority decision to be considered valid regardless

of the proportion of the whole voting, provided that if the
decision is challenged it will be considered at a fixed timed
at the next regular meeting period of the organization and
shall then be decided without debate by a majority of those
voting* ;

1

Second, when an organization elects to require a quorum
number for the transaction of business, the following are
RecommendedI
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1.

The quorum requirement should emanate from a con

stitution in order to prevent easy access to a potential
device of obstructionism.

Further, this makes it difficult

for the executive to gain undue control over the legislative
by preventing executive attempts to reduce the quorum and thus
gaining undue persuasion and advantagei
2*

Recognition by the chair that when a quorum does not

exist it is his duty to so notice and take appropriate action
within the framework of the organization^ constitution.

When

a quorum is assumed when one is not present, the situation is
contrary to fact and at best an ostrich-like approach:
3*

The quorum requirement should not be used as a device

to force attendance, as in early English Parliaments, since
such a practice creates the potential for new, additional
problems.

A new system should be utilized to force attendance—

if it need be forced at alii •
A high quorum number should be selected by an organi
zation whose structure includes a strong executive, i.e., broad
'i *;.•

:

powers given to a president, mayor, etc.

Such a number will

reduce the possibility of executive attempts to manipulate a
!
'
j
select few members to form a quorum to do the executive's^
or anyone else’s special projects:
- i

i 5»

'

Each organization should enact rules-that call for the

reading of bills, taking of votes, etc., only on given days or
meetings in a regular sequence.

109
6.

Members should be required to answer quorum calls if

physically present, or suffer official reprimand and deemed in
contempt, or possibly fined:
7.

For legislative bodies without strong executives, as

opposed to private,^single purpose groups, the quorum number
should be low— at least less than a majority, to allow for the
multiplicity of legislative business.

There are many aspects

of business which a fairly small portion of the whole can
handle with dispatch while being fully accountable to total
membership.

Redress of any alleged wrongs could be considered

by opening debate:
8.

Any large organization and particularly legislatures of

civil governments should use electronic devices to speed quorum:
counts.
The above are listed in hopes that the quorum, or lack
of one, will in the future be a device to speed parliamentary
procedure, and assist in ending the problems historically
associated with it.
1 III

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY

1 !

This study has been limited to one rule (or device)
of parliamentary procedure and makes no attempt to investi
gate the numerous other devices which form the corpus of rules
known as parliamentary procedure.

In fact, there is little

evidence to suggest that parliamentary procedure has been
the target of a great deal of historical study at any time.
This absence forms the justification of additional studies

110
Into the developments and philosophies of parliamentary
procedures.
The past two thousand years have seen continual growth
of regulations imposed bit by bit or in bulk, as in the case of
legislative bodies that underwent major reform acts resulting
in fundamental changes and additions to procedure.

There is

a need then, not only to probe deeper into aspects of the
quorum but to trace historically the many faceted devices of
procedure from their earliest appearances, through their adop
tion and modification, to the final stage of common usage.
Specifically then, there is a need for additional
studies into the growth of rules and philosophies of parlia
mentary devices in order to one day form a basis of a
comprehensive history of parliamentary procedure.

Further,

a need exists for investigations into the status of present
day parliamentary procedure to determine comparative relation
ships between major private and public legislative bodies of
.the world*
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